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China’s economic reform which started in late 1970s has triggered profound 
institutional changes and economic transformation. The market mechanisms have 
gradually replaced central planning controls in many segments including the urban 
land reform. As land is one of the most valuable assets, urban land reform has long 
been the focal point of the overall economic reform. During the gradual process of 
urban land reform, a number of problems have been generated regarding to the land 
resource allocation and land use. The primary objective of this research is to identify 
and to assess how the government intervention and policies shaped and influenced 
the progress of urban land reform in the economy of transition. Besides, the 
transformation of urban spatial structure in the economic reform and urbanization 
are also examined. 
 
In this study, Beijing as the national capital is used to illustrate the reform process of 
public land leasing and how government policies affect urban land value in a 
transitional economy. Empirical analyses with aggregate and disaggregate public 
land leasing data in Beijing from 2002 to 2005 have demonstrated that government 
policies have significant impact on the process of urban land reform and the 
determination of land value by means of various regulations such as site density 
restriction and mode of land leasing. A hedonic price model with geostatistical 
procedure is employed for empirical testing to deal with the potential spatial 
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autocorrelation problem in the cross-sectional public land leasing data and to obtain 
more accurate coefficient estimates and statistical inference. In this manner, the 
determinants and their impacts in the public land leasing are also analyzed for the 
better understanding of land pricing mechanism and the process of urban land 
reform in China.  
 
This study concludes that in the urban land reform, fiscal decentralization has 
brought fiscal incentives to local government to raise land revenue in order to 
finance local developments. Site density restriction and mode of land leasing 
become important means of land use regulation in the public land leasing process. 
Local governments can benefit a lot more by the rising of land lease prices and the 
government officials tend to have more opportunities to be promoted according to 
the local economic development. However, the complex intergovernmental 
relationships also pose constraints on the autonomy of local government. Thus, 
balancing the incentives and needs among different levels of government has always 
been a crucial consideration for the policy-making in fiscal system and economic 
reform.  
 
The research findings in this study have provided valuable implications for both 
policymakers and practitioners in real estate industry by filling the gap in both 
academic research and practical experiences. The analytical framework and 
empirical results can not only apply to the study in urban land market in Beijing but 
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also contribute to a wider understanding of China’s urban development in the 
transitional context. Future research with the development of urban land market and 
the available of public land leasing data can be done to reveal more about the 
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CHAPTER 1   
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of the Research 
As the People’s Republic of China has advanced various economic reforms and 
been restructuring its socialist economy, market mechanisms are gradually replacing 
central planning controls in many segments since the late seventies of twentieth 
century. However, land resources, the largest assets of the state, have still long been 
administrated and allocated by means of central planning till mid 1980s. As political 
sensitive commodities in China, land may not be allocated according to efficiency 
principles and land use system is mainly based on state allocation. The overall 
economic reforms and the open door policy implemented in China have driven the 
urban land reform towards market orientation. The need for urban land reform and 
the setting-up for the urban land market arose for the reason that land had to be 
utilized efficiently in order to provide a source of revenue to both central and local 
governments and create social wealth for the whole nation. Under this 
circumstances, there are several problems along with the land reform process, such 
as too many government regulations in the wrong places, while not enough right 
regulations in the right places (Dowall and Clark, 1996), and the distortion or even 
absence of land value and price mechanism which are fundamental in land market, 
etc. Thus it is necessary to know why and how government is involved in the land 
reform process, as well as the land values in the land market of transition economy 
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and the affecting factors in the price mechanism. 
 
The gigantic economic reforms and the real estate development have also driven 
tremendous urbanization progress in most Chinese cities over the past 20 years. The 
urbanization process has greatly changed the urban spatial structure of Chinese 
cities. In this process, urban land reform has played a significant role in shaping the 
new urban form and closely linked with the reforms of other economic sectors. In 
the previously planned-control urbanization, migration of the population, productive 
factors and so forth had been administratively restricted and much controlled by the 
government. However, in the urban land reform the ideology regarding land as 
tradable land use rights (LURs)1 separated from ownership rights, and the methods 
of selling land use rights are more or less the same as those in market economy. 
Moreover, land benchmark price (BMP) system2 served as official guideline prices 
for the public land leasing as there are no value or market comparables for land in 
the previous planned economy and urban land reform. Many urban problems 
emerged in this process such as improper land use planning and land allocation 
(Dowall, 1993), lack of price mechanism in urban land market reform (Li, 1997), 
disorders and the spatial mismatch in public land leasing (Deng 2003, Han 2000), 
etc. These problems spurred the thinking on the forces behind these phenomena and 
the efforts for possible solutions to these problems. 
                                                        
1 The state grants land users the right to use the state-owned land for a certain number of years and the users 
shall pay the state for the the land use rights (LURs). 
2 In major Chinese cities, BMPs serve as the guideline price for granting the LURs and normally will be 
adjusted every 4-5 years. 
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The urban land reform started in some Special Economic Zones (SEZs) around the 
coastal regions in China and the leasing of urban land use rights in Shenzhen in 
1987 was the pioneer case in urban land reform. However, the urban land reform did 
not spread to inland areas until early 1990s. Beijing as the capital city of the 
socialist country with heavy political atmosphere fell way behind the 
rapid-developing coastal regions and served a good case to illustrate the how 
government interventions and political considerations are involved in public land 
leasing process as well as the implementation of urban land reform. From the 
ideology of centrally planning to the market mechanisms, the urban land reform in 
Beijing could contribute to the wider scope of urban land reform as well as the 
economic transition in China. The case of Beijing also gives explicit explanations 
and policy implications on urban land leasing and the impact on the outcomes of the 
market reform, as the central government, Beijing municipal government and local 
district governments all reside in the city and provide the natural test bed for the 
social experiments in urban land reform. Those implications and suggestions 
regarding to land leasing and real estate development from this research could also 
be of great value to policymakers, developers and other parties in this reform 
process. 
1.2 Objectives of the Study  
In the context of rapid urbanization and urban growth in contemporary China, 
examining the change of urban land value and the evolution of land market in China 
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will help us have more understanding of certain important aspects. First, a structured 
introduction and analysis of the public land leasing system will tell us how the urban 
land market advance and urban land market evolve in accordance with the general 
economic reform from planned control to market orientations. The empirical study 
of Beijing will show the common practices of public land leasing and the 
relationships among different levels of government, as well as the transformation of 
urban spatial pattern with land and housing developments in recent years of reform. 
 
Second, restrictions on site density at which development would occur have long 
been regarded as an important tool of land use regulation, especially in the 
previously planned economies like China. In the transition from centrally planned 
economy to market economies, the function and effects which land use planning and 
regulations generate during this process have been little studied in the empirical 
literature. The emerging land market in Beijing and the availability of land 
transaction data make it possible of more empirical analysis on the relationship 
between land value and site density restriction in a transitional economy, as well as 
the impacts of land use regulations of both municipal and district government on the 
structure density of real estate development. In this study, an empirical methodology 
is used to identify the degree to which restrictions on the ratio of floor area to 
ground space (also known as floor-to-land area ratio, FAR; or plot ratio, PR) 
constrain real estate developments. By measuring the effects of allowed plot ratio on 
the land prices, we may see how the incentives facing with governments on land use 
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regulation and development density control may affect market outcome in the urban 
development and redevelopment of Beijing, China. 
 
Third, the modes (private negotiation, tender and auction) through which public land 
is leased to land users have reflected the degree of marketization in urban land 
reform towards market orientations. Compared to private negotiation, tender and 
auction represent a more transparent mechanism for land acquisition rather an 
invisible transaction under the table. Thus it has great significance to discover the 
impacts of modes on land values, especially in the economy of transition. In 
addition, by analyzing the price mechanism of public land leasing in Beijing, we can 
improve our understanding on the determinants of land value comparing with the 
existing benchmark prices system in the transitional economy. The insights of the 
price mechanism in the urban land reform would provide valuable policy 
implications to improve the outcome of market reform and for other transitional 
economies as well. 
 
These objectives of the research will be studied and achieved with a conceptualized 
framework and empirical analysis in the following sections of this thesis. 
1.3 Research Questions 
Land use regulations would have significant impacts on land value, thus motivating 
local authorities to consider respective zoning regulations and to discover the 
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affecting forces in the determination of land leasing prices. With this rationale, we 
want to examine what are the changes of land values and urban land pricing 
mechanisms within contemporary Chinese cities, especially in the case of Beijing, 
the nation’s capital city, in the transitional context of economic reform and 
urbanization. Besides, we also want to know the price mechanism for urban land in 
the urban land reform and how government regulations in terms of site density 
restrictions affect the reform outcome and the underlying incentives and objectives 
of the government behaviors. This study also tries to present an intuitive picture of 
the land development in spatial dimension and the urbanization process in the 
economy of transition. 
 
The research questions could be generalized as follows: 
 
(1) What are the determinants in urban land values in the process of urban land 
reforms in Beijing, China? 
(2) How does government intervene in the urban land reform through the means of 
site density restrictions? 
(3) How do the different modes of public land leasing in the urban land reform 
process affect urban land value and advance towards market orientations? 
1.4 Research Methodology 
At macro level, overall urban land reform process and urban land developments in 
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China and Beijing are studied, especially in the context of Beijing city during the 
period with intensive public land leasing and real estate developments as to examine 
the evolvement of urban land leasing and land use policies in transitional economy. 
We also want to discover the process of urban land leasing and land development in 
Beijing and in China and present a clear picture of the urban land reform in the 
economy of transition. 
 
At micro level, a hedonic price model is employed focusing on the inferences of the 
implicit prices of land and housing attributes as well as their neighborhood 
characteristics. The hedonic land price could be expressed as a function of 
characteristics including structural characteristics, neighborhood and 
socio-economic characteristics, location characteristics and time effects. Under the 
circumstances of urban land market in Beijing, we want to examine a set of factors 
that determine the land price, such as the plot size, the allowed plot ratio, location of 
the parcel, the mode of LURs transfer, the time when the land is leased and so forth. 
Based on the hedonic price model, various hypotheses are tested in order to answer 
the research questions raised in our study. As spatial characteristics matter in land 
and housing prices, the existence of spatial autocorrelation in the neighborhood land 
parcels will cause OLS estimates of coefficients inefficient and statistic inference 
invalid. In this case, alternative methods such as maximum likelihood estimates 
(MLE) or generalized least square (GLS) become more credible for estimating 
efficient coefficient and the hypothesis testing. Based on urban land leasing data in 
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Beijing from 2002-2005, a Kriging method was used to measure neighborhood and 
accessibility effects especially in the analysis of cross-sectional data in the presence 
of spatial autocorrelation. By doing this the estimates of coefficients would be 
efficient and consistent and more credible hypothesis testing results can be obtained. 
1.5 Research Data  
Macro economic indices, including GDP, inflation rate, population density, 
investment on real estate development are obtained from the statistics bureau of the 
state and Beijing municipal government. At micro level, urban land leasing data 
consists of 1363 observations of residential LURs sales granted by Land Assembly 
Center of Beijing Municipal Government from January 2002 to December 2005. For 
each site, we know the location, its geographic coordinates, its transaction land price, 
lot size, mode of leasing, the permitted land use type plot ratio to be developed at 
the site, time of LURs sale and other characteristics. The empirical testing of this 
study focus on the impact of the site density restriction and modes of land leasing on 
the land value and the underlying government behaviors, and thus land parcels of 
residential land use are the concentration in order to simplify the analysis. 
1.6 Organization of the Study  
This study is organized into six chapters and the structure is as follows: 
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Chapter 1 provides an outline of this research, which consists of the introduction of 
the study, research objectives, research questions, research data and the 
methodology used in this study.  
 
Chapter 2 first reviews the literature on the property price gradients and its related 
assumptions and empirical methodologies, as well as the related studies on urban 
spatial structure. The literature on the urban land reform, land use regulations and 
government policies in China is then extensively reviewed. 
 
Chapter 3 analyses the urban land reform and the public land leasing process in 
China, and then raises problems in the land leasing process and the necessity of 
in-depth exploration of the pricing mechanism with respect to the urban land reform 
process in Beijing. 
 
Chapter 4 proposes a conceptualized framework for the analysis of research 
questions and the hypotheses to be tested with the empirical model. It then 
introduces the research methodology employed in this study. 
 
Chapter 5 presents an empirical study on urban land leasing in Beijing at both 
aggregate and disaggregate levels. Economic interpretations and inferences are also 
drawn from the empirical analysis. 
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Chapter 6 concludes the research findings and contributions together with the 
existing limitations in this study. Some further policy implication and suggestions 
























In this chapter, literatures on the property price gradients and urban spatial structure 
are first reviewed. As we are trying to discover the impacts of the determinants in 
urban land value, a thorough review of the literatures on urban land and housing 
price gradients will help us conceptualize the analytical framework and facilitate the 
variable selection in the empirical specifications. In Chapter 4, analytical framework 
and empirical model have been set up based on the discussion of theories on land 
price determinants and government behaviors in economy of transition. Moreover, 
in the context of urban land reform in China, studies on land use regulation and 
government behaviors are also extensively examined.  
2.2 Studies on Property Price Gradients  
There are a number of theoretical and empirical literatures on the land and housing 
price gradients. Yiu and Tam (2004) categorized that there are three assumptions on 
the spatial structure and two different methodologies of estimation and empirical 
testing. These three assumptions are: (1) the monocentric assumption (Burnell, 1985; 
Coulson and Engle, 1987; Diamond and Gerety, 1995; Mok, Chan and Cho, 1995; 
Atack and Margo, 1998; Dunse and Jones, 1998; Cheshire and Sheppard, 1998; 
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Soderberg and Janssen, 2001; Tse and Chan, 2003; McMillen, 2003; etc.,); (2) the 
non-monocentric/polycentric assumption (Dubin and Sung, 1987; Heikkila, et al., 
1989; McDonald and McMillen, 1990; Sivitanidou, 1996, 1997; etc.,); and (3) no 
priori assumption about the urban spatial structure (Odland, 1972; Coulson, 1991; 
etc.,). The two methodologies of estimations are (1) the hedonic pricing model 
(Rosen, 1974; Case, Cropper, Deck and McConnell, 1988; Pollakowski and 
Wachter, 1991; Can, 1992; etc.,) and (2) the repeat-sales model (Bailey, Muth and 
Nourse, 1963; Messe and Wallace, 1997; etc.,). In the following sections, studies on 
property price gradients and urban spatial structure with competing assumptions and 
different methodologies of estimation are carefully reviewed.  
2.2.1 Studies of Urban Spatial Structure with Competing Assumptions 
2.2.1.1 Studies with the Monocentric Assumption 
There are a large amount of empirical studies with the monocentric assumption in 
previous literature. Atack and Margo (1998) examined the price gradient of vacant 
urban land in New York City over a 66-year period, which was from 1835 to 1900. 
This historical study has discovered the impacts of the development of public 
transportations and growing prosperity on the price gradient. Dunse and Jones (1998) 
tried to study the locational effects on office rents in the central area of Glasgow. 
They found a significant negative price gradient to a particular street and argued that 
was the center of the CBD. However, several other location-specific dummy 
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variables such as Central Core, Central Mid, Central Outer and Peripheral were 
included in the model and these probably distorted the coefficient of the 
distance-to-CBD. Mok, Chan and Cho (1995) studied the hedonic price of private 
housing properties in Hong Kong. They incorporated the Box-Cox Transformation 
in the model to relax the assumption of the functional form of the model and 
obtained negative and significant price gradients. However, the results have very 
limited implications for the monocentric assumption as they confined their study in 
a narrow scope which may not be representative. Instead of a two dimensional 
distance-to-CBD variable, Cheshire and Sheppard (1998) derived a three 
dimensional price contour estimation model, which allowed for different price 
gradients at different orientations. By allowing differences in topology, accessibility, 
land use and amenities, this model was a great improvement over the 
two-dimensional model. Yet, it was still regarded to rely on a monocentric 
assumption and a distance-to-CBD proxy (Yiu and Tam, 2004). 
 
In the analytical framework of the bid-rent curve, there are also many studies using 
the cost of commuting from the property to the CBD as a proxy. The widespread use 
of distance-to-CBD in the literature is “probably the result of the ease of measuring 
physical distances on a map; or the lack of data on commuting costs” (Yiu and Tam, 
2004). Coulson and Engle (1987) used differences in commuting cost to explain 
variations in urban-suburban housing prices in the US. Although the authors' 
purpose was not to estimate the price gradient, their results showed that the cost of 
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commuting from a suburban area to an urban area has a negative impact on housing 
prices. Burnell (1985) also used commuting cost to determine the accessibility of 
residential housing. He assumed that the higher the commuting cost, the lower the 
accessibility it had. Based on this assumption, he has got a positive coefficient for 
accessibility from the negative relationship between commuting cost and housing 
value. However, the assumption of a positive relationship between distance and cost 
may not be valid, especially when this area has a well-developed public 
transportation system. In addition, the cost of commuting may not completely 
correlate with distance, because of differences in topology and in the transportation 
facilities provided. In addition, commuting time is also commonly served as a proxy. 
For example, Tse and Chan (2003) have estimated the housing price gradient in 
Hong Kong by using both commuting cost and commuting time. In the 
cross-sectional hedonic regression with random samples of housing transaction 
records, they used commuting cost, commuting time, age of dwelling and two 
locational dummy variables as the independent variables. They found significantly 
negative housing price gradients in regard to both commuting cost and commuting 
time. This has supported their assumption that the time spent on transportation is an 
economic disutility for the household. 
 
There are many other attempts to back up the monocentric assumption. Soderberg 
and Janssen (2001) carried out estimations of the price gradients of apartments 
within a small region in Stockholm from the first quarter of 1992 to the last quarter 
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of 1994. Instead of the traditional distance-to-CBD variable, they also incorporated 
interactive dummy variables among orientations and distance. The results showed 
that the price gradients in all directions were negative, with the eastern gradient the 
least negative. The authors explained that the eastern area was traditionally the most 
desirable residential area in Stockholm and it tended to have least impacts on 
housing prices. Diamond and Gerety (1995) allowed for heterogeneous consumer 
preferences when calculating distance-to-CBD, in contrast to the conventional 
assumption of a homogeneous preference. They put forward their Generalized 
Fechner-Thurstone model to estimate the price gradient in Greenville, South 
Carolina. 
 
McMillen (2003) was the first to apply the repeat sales model to estimate price 
gradient. He studied transactions of single-family houses in the city of Chicago from 
January 1983 to December 1998. The objective of his study was to test the price 
gradient of a monocentric city. McMillen included interactive dummy variables for 
distance-to-CBD and period of the transaction, in which he made the assumption 
that the price gradient varied over time. But he included the age of dwellings in the 
model, which is suspected to be exactly collinear with the period of the transactions. 
However, he got negative price gradients in the first part of the analysis. In the 
second part, he smoothed the time series price index by using the Fourier approach 
to repeat sales price index. The results have supported the negative price gradient in 
Chicago. 
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2.2.1.2 Studies with the Non-monocentric/Polycentric Assumption 
The rationale behind the monocentric model is that employment or any other 
business activities are concentrated at the CBD, such that the cost to access the CBD 
is a major determinant of property values. However, the monocentric assumption 
has neglected some possible effects of the presence of subcenters or other centers, 
which may not be negligible. Therefore, a non-monocentric or polycentric 
assumption was suggested by Heikkila, et al. (1989). In their study of residential 
properties in Los Angeles, they included distances-to-CBDs and eighteen other 
housing attributes in a hedonic regression model. It is worthy to note that while all 
of the other eighteen attributes were significant with expected signs, the coefficients 
of the distances-to-CBDs were positive and not significant. Thus it is argued that the 
rationale behind the multi-centers setting is that different centers should be 
responsible for different functions in the city, and that each of these functions 
should have its value assessed in terms of the nearby properties, for example, 
employment center, shopping center, recreational center, and so forth (Yiu and Tam, 
2004). 
 
McDonald and McMillen (1990) studied the change of land value in Chicago 
between the 1960s and the 1980s. They argued that the conventional CBD of 
Chicago was still an important employment center; while the area around O'Hare 
Airport had emerged as another major sub-center for employment. Sivitanidou 
(1996) studied the value of office-commercial firms in Los Angeles. She identified a 
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main service employment center and eight sub-centers and found that 
office-commercial firms valued access to the sub-centers, and that the main center 
did not substitute perfectly for the sub-centers. Sivitanidou (1997) further confirmed 
that the effect of the main center and of the group of sub-centers on the value of the 
office commercial firms was weakening (i.e., the price gradient from the centers was 
flattening) in the period between 1989 and 1994. The findings matched more closely 
with the dispersal of business locations during this period. In addition, the argument 
that price gradients are changing over time was also supported. Dubin and Sung 
(1987) attempted a ray estimation of price gradients. They claimed that the 
non-directional distance measurement could not reflect the uneven development of 
the transportation system. They were also concerned about the effects of sub-centers 
on housing values and their results showed that the CBD appeared to exert an effect 
similar to the other sub-centers. Therefore, the presence of sub-centers or other 
centers should be taken into account in studies on price gradients. 
2.2.1.3 Studies of Urban Spatial Structure without a Priori Assumption  
The above polycentric studies assume the presence of different centers with 
different roles and functions. Although researches have examined the 
substitutability of the centers, it is not easy to differentiate the role of each 
sub-center (Sivitanidou, 1996). This problem would be worsen if the subject area is 
self-contained (i.e., each sub-center performs almost all the required functions and is 
almost perfectly substitutable with another). Some studies, for example, those by 
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Odland (1972) and Coulson (1991), tried to formulate the conditions for the 
existence of a non-monocentric city and empirically test for the monocentric 
assumption. These studies have enlightened us on choosing the "right" urban spatial 
structure in studies on property price gradients, as they gave benchmarks for the 
price gradient analysis (Yiu and Tam, 2004). 
2.2.2 Studies of Urban Spatial Structure with Different Empirical 
Models 
2.2.2.1 Empirical Models  
Two main empirical techniques are prevailing in the analyses of property values. 
One is the conventional hedonic pricing model and the other is the repeat sales 
model. The hedonic price model is a multiple regression of the price of a 
heterogeneous good on a number of characteristics associated with each good 
(Rosen, 1974). The coefficients of the hedonic regression are regarded as the 
hedonic (implicit) prices of the characteristics. The heterogeneous nature of real 
estate properties makes property market a good candidate for the application of the 
hedonic regression. Physical attributes, neighborhood characteristics and locational 
factors are commonly considered in the studies on property prices. If the 




The hedonic pricing model is widely used as it requires relatively fewer transaction 
records to estimate the value of housing, and it is more flexible for researchers to 
use when including different explanatory variables in the regression or when 
changing the functional form of the model. This advantage, however, is also the 
major weakness of the hedonic price model. The choice of independent variables 
and functional form is related to specification bias and inefficiency of estimation 
(Case, Pollakowski and Wachter, 1991). Studies on the choice of functional form 
and explanatory variables for hedonic price functions have already given rise to a 
large body of literature (e.g. Cropper, Deck and McConnell, 1988; and Can, 1992). 
 
Another approach of estimation is the repeat sales model, which was first 
formulated by Bailey, Muth and Nourse (1963). Each observation used in the repeat 
sales model is a pair of transactions for a single piece of property. This pair-wise 
feature facilitates researchers to choose explanatory variables, as the attributes of 
each property will be cancelled out in the estimation model. Yet, the repeat sales 
model depends greatly on the availability of a large number of transaction records in 
order to obtain an adequate number of observations on repeat sales (two or more 
sales of a property) for the estimation. This is not a common characteristic in most 
property markets. In addition, the repeat sales model is very sensitive to influential 
observations (Messe and Wallace, 1997). 
 
Since both techniques have their strengths and weaknesses, there is no general rule 
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to guide the choice of a methodology for constructing a housing price index. The 
decision should be made with respect to the type of analysis that will be conducted 
(Messe and Wallace, 1997). Yet, judging from the literature on property price 
gradients, hedonic regression analysis is employed far more often than the repeat 
sales model (Yiu and Tam 2004). This is because no specific assumption except the 
location of the CBD is required to include the factor of distance-to-CBD in the 
hedonic model; while if the distance-to-CBD is included in the repeat sales model, 
an extra assumption needs to be made in addition to the assumption on the location 
of the CBD. This additional assumption is that the price gradient is dynamic rather 
than static; thus, the repeat sales model can estimate the price gradient at each point 
in time. This assumption may not be true in some studies, especially when those 
transactions occur within a relatively short period of time. 
2.2.2.2 Spatial Autocorrelations in Estimation 
The failure of the monocentric gradient in empirical studies has raised questions 
about the problems in estimations due to spatial autocorrelations. The term spatial 
autocorrelation is an extension of the concept of serial autocorrelation in the field of 
time series analysis (Cliff and Ord, 1981). The residuals of a regression are said to 
be spatially autocorrelated if the value of the residual at certain location is 
consistently dependent of the value(s) of the neighboring residual(s). This problem 
arises because the neighboring properties share some common attributes of location; 
for example, common public facilities, common public car park or common 
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shopping mall. Dubin, Pace and Thibodeau (1999) presented a comprehensive 
discussion of this problem and described how spatial techniques can be used to 
improve the precision of estimations. Wiltshaw (1996) confirmed possible 
limitations to the accuracy and efficiency of hedonic price estimates without 
considering the issue of spatial autocorrelation. Other studies, such as those by Can 
(1992), Can and Megbolugbe (1997), Pace and Gilley (1997, 1998) and Goetzmann 
and Spiegel (1997), have considered and/or tested the presence of spatial 
autocorrelation. 
 
Numerous methods have been proposed to test and correct for spatial 
autocorrelation. For example, Sun, Tu and Yu (2004) proposed a spatio-temporal 
autoregressive model for multi-unit residential market analysis based on the sales 
record of condominiums in Singapore. They used the weighted least squares (WLS) 
method to "spatially randomize" the residuals. Pace and Gilley (1997), on the other 
hand, performed simultaneous autoregression (SAR) on Harrison and Rubinfeld's 
(1978) data. They also performed an OLS estimation to serve as the benchmark. The 
logarithm of the transaction price was the dependent variable and distance to the 
employment center was included in the set of independent variables. When 
comparing the OLS estimates and the SAR maximum likelihood estimates (MLE), it 
was observed that the SAR MLE had a higher R2 and that the sum of the square 
errors (SSE) of SAR MLE was 44% less than that of the OLS estimation. However, 
no studies were found that successfully show a significant monocentric gradient 
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after the remedial of the spatial autocorrelation. Further studies in this area are 
clearly needed. 
2.3 Urban Land Reform, Land Use Regulations and 
Government Behaviors in China 
2.3.1 Economic Reform and Economy in Transition 
The late twentieth century has witnessed gigantic transformations of economic 
systems around the world from a centrally planned system to a market system. In 
Eastern Europe, reforms dated as early as 1968 in Hungary, 1980 in Poland, and 1985 
in the Soviet Union, but the reforms did not succeed until 1990s. The former Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe followed a path of democratization preceded economic 
liberalization towards privatization. However, the specific processes and result of 
transition in these countries are not the same. For example, while the Czech Republic 
and Russia implemented mass privatization, Hungary and Poland did not experience 
the same process (Qian, 1999). 
 
Jones (2003) concluded that there are several characteristics in the economic reform 
and urban land market in transition. Rapid urbanization and urban poverty has 
become a notable phenomenon in the transition economy (Ruell et al. 1999; 
Satterthwaite 1997; UNDP 1998; Wekwete 1999; World Bank 2000). Meanwhile, 
there is greater attention to property rights in the development agenda. The studies 
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of new institutional economics examine thoroughly in the field of economic 
transition. The influential work by Douglass North (1990) and Elinor Ostrom (1990) 
paved a new pathway and examined the property rights revolutions, promoted as 
part of multi and bi- lateral reform schemes in Eastern Europe, sub-Saharan Africa, 
Latin America and South-east Asia (GTZ 1998; Platteau 1996; Zoomers and van der 
Haar 2000, Jones 2003). As one of the most important socialist countries, China has 
taken a remarkable path of transformations in which economic reform and transition 
to markets occurred without democratization, while liberalization and privatization 
proceeded incrementally. The land reforms along with the economic reform and 
development have also been experiencing a gradual approach towards market 
orientation.  
2.3.2 Studies on the Urban Land Market Reform in China  
The literature has examined extensively the problems arising from emerging land 
market and urban land reform in transitional economy (Dowall and Leaf, 1991; 
Dowall, 1992b; Dowall 1993a, 1993b; Gaubatz, 1995; Wu, 1995; Yeh and Wu, 
1995; Yeh and Wu, 1996; Li 1996, 1999; Leaf, 1997; Wu, 1997; Wu and Yeh, 1999; 
Fu and Somerville, 2001; Deng, 2003; Ding 2003, 2004). Empirical studies have 
shown that even though transitional economies have their own unique set of 
industrialization and urbanization process that do not exactly replicate ones 
experienced in developed cities, it is observed that there is a remarkable similarity in 
urban spatial structure between developing and developed countries (Dowall and 
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Leaf, 1991; Dowall and Treffeisen, 1991; Dowall, 1992b). Fung (1981) argued 
urban sprawl was attributed to government’s ‘squandering’ behavior and emulating 
socialist regulations in land development. Land values, population density, and land 
use intensity tend to decrease away from urban centers, resulting from a tradeoff 
between accessibility and housing and/or land prices in a maximization of residents’ 
utilities. Evidence supports the notion of land-capital substitution in emerging land 
markets (Dowall and Treffeisen 1991), which marks the impacts of price 
mechanisms on land development. Dowall (1992) compared several Chinese cities 
especially the cases of Tianjin and Guangzhou and examined five elements: land 
allocation and property rights, land use planning and regulation, infrastructure 
provision and financing, urban redevelopment, land information system in urban 
land management system in terms of specific problems and opportunities for land 
reform. He pointed out that China should introduce modifications in the land market 
reform gradually. He also marked out China should find new ways to distribute land 
in the future and correct inefficiencies in land use. Xie etc. (2002) argued that the 
market for the transfer of LURs has not yet developed, which may be due to the 
existence of the dual-track market, the huge stock and new supply of 
administratively allocated land, the great difference between the low cost of 
administratively allocated land use and market prices, and the existence of an 
uncontrolled black market. A number of measures to improve the urban land market 
are also suggested to be introduced. Deng (2003) looked at development zones1 and 
                                                        
1 In the early 1990s, there was a fever of development zones in Chinese cities in order to attract investment and 
boost economic development.  
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semi-urbanized villages1 in urban expansion based on the case study of Beijing and 
concluded that the approach of gradual reform in China’s economic transition could 
be a meaningful short-run solution for the economy in transition, yet it will result in 
inefficient resource allocation at the interface of different sectors. Development 
zones and semi-urban villages are thus examples of inefficient resource allocation. 
A systematic study by Ho and Lin (2003) investigates the evolution of land use 
system and political forces in China, from socialist era to current market economy. 
Deng (2003a, c) explored the role of public land leasing in mitigating the 
uncertainty from a non-democratic state and its beneficial impact on local public 
finance. In addition to generating local revenues and freeing land from the rigid 
planned system, public land leasing assists urban renewal and housing reform. On 
the other hand, the studies on rural land reform are usually separate from those on 
urban land reform and places more emphasis on its impact on agriculture or the 
countryside.  
 
There is a large stream of researches focusing on the economic reform and land 
development using property rights approach. Planning controls, which attenuate 
property rights over urban land market by the state’s possession of development 
rights, are considered to make the land market more efficient because legal 
development controls provide the land market with certainties which are essential 
for maintaining market confidence (Pigou, 1932; Nelson, 1977; Brabant, 1991; Lai, 
                                                        
1 During the rapid urban expansion in Chinese cities, there are a large amount of village-alike places lagging 
behind urban development (Deng, 2003). 
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1999). Therefore, by assigning rights and liabilities, the state may play a role that is 
conductive to efficiency (Lai, 1997). Rent dissipation may occur due to the 
attenuation of property rights by state intervention (Stull, 1975; Mark and Goldberg, 
1981). Lai (1997) pointed out that the ‘meaningful question is whether the cost of 
such attenuation is greater or smaller than the alternative of leaving the matter 
entirely to the unregulated market’. He argued that vague property rights over urban 
land will leave valued assets in the public domain for competitive access, and 
inefficient land development due to externalities will be exacerbated as a result. Ho 
(2001) also argued that institutional ambiguity of land ownership may also help 
preserve maneuver space for government in the future. Zhu (2002) pointed out that 
“an emerging real estate market structured by transitional institutions stimulates 
agents to respond to market demand, but the problem of ambiguous property rights 
derived from gradualism in the reforms does not lead to an efficient allocation of 
development resources, because market mechanisms are distorted by the ambiguous 
delineation of property rights over land assets”. 
2.3.3 Land Use Regulations and Government Behaviors in the Land 
Market Reform 
There are also a growing number of literatures on land use regulations and 
government behaviors in the land market reform in the transition economy. The 
analysis of competing interest in regulating land use by different levels of local 
government in Beijing would have regulation to the substantial literature on fiscal 
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federalism and public finance. Qian and Stiglitz, Wong (1997), Cullen and Fu (1998) 
analyzed the allocation of power and property rights between central and local 
government in China, and Li et al. (1999) and Gordon and Li (1997) analyzed how 
competition among local governments fostered the growth of private enterprises. 
Liang (1999) examined government behavior in the development of real estate 
industry in China. Li (1997) examined the problem that Chinese authorities granted 
land use rights by private negotiation even though the land is actually underpriced 
and distorted, and how planned and market economies co-exist. He analyzed 180 
pieces of land sales in urban Shanghai during 1992 and 1993 and came to the 
findings that in transition economy, political and ideological preferences always 
take priority over actual economic consequences. Gradualist approach of selective 
privatization of LURs has created a very active land market. At the beginning of 
LURs reform, real estate developers gained substantial profit. Profit-sharing 
problem exists in the land leasing process between local authorities and central 
government. There is underpricing situation in the land market and distortion in the 
land use pattern because land is not priced according to bid-rent theory. Deng (2003) 
studied the political economy and local government behavior in urban land reform 
and public land leasing in China, especially in Beijing. By analyzing the economic 
circumstances under which China adopted the land leasing system and the issues 
with local government’s multiple roles and their incentives aligned with public 
interest, he argued that under the Chinese public land leasehold system, the 
government is simultaneously the land owner, provider of collective goods, and 
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owner and manager of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The experience of public 
land leasing in China may suggest an appropriate transitory land tenure arrangement 
for transitional economy and strong intergovernmental competition could be an 
important factor that contributes to the efficiency of public land leasing.  
 
There are some literatures on the effects of site density restrictions and the mode of 
public land leasing on land value in the context of China’s transition economy. Fu 
and Somerville (2001) theoretically explored the measurement and impacts of site 
density restrictions on land prices and conducted empirical analysis of urban land 
development in Shanghai, China. Their empirical analysis evaluated how different 
interest between the two levels of governments influence the outcomes of urban 
development and demonstrated that the structure of revenue and power sharing 
between different level of governments affect the pattern of redevelopment. On the 
other hand, few literatures touched how different modes of public land leasing 
would affect land price and the urban land reform process. Yang and Mao (2001) 
studied the urban land pricing mechanism in China and argued that the modes of 
tender and auction are much more competitive than private negotiation and the land 
lease prices by tender and auction are higher than that by private negotiation. 
However, they failed to have empirical evidence to further confirm their argument. 
In this sense, it would be worthwhile to test these hypotheses regarding the 
government behavior and the shift of modes towards market orientation with more 
detailed micro-level public land leasing data. 
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The literatures review above have paved out the knowledge and insights on the 
property price gradients, urban land reform, land use regulations and thus the 
government behaviors in the process of China’s transition from previous planned 
economy to market orientations. The studies on property price gradients identify the 
underlying assumptions and empirical specification which are important for 
analytical framework and variable selection in examining the urban spatial structure. 
Reviewing the literatures on urban land reform process in China provides us with a 
clear institutional context in exploring and progress of public land leasing and the 
















URBAN LAND REFORM AND PUBLIC LAND 
LEASING IN CHINA  
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter describes the background of urban land reform and the public land 
leasing process in China and raises problems in the land leasing process and the 
necessity of in-depth exploration of the pricing mechanism with respect to the urban 
land reform process in Beijing. Some main issues in the public land leasing are 
briefly analyzed and the objective of the study is also stated.  
3.2 Background of Urban Land Reform in China 
The urban land reform in China has been a gradual process and linked closely with 
the tremendous economic reforms throughout the country since 1980s. The rapid 
growing economy has demanded corresponding reforms in the administrative and 
management system of various sectors. As one of the most important and valuable 
state-owned assets, land resource has long been used inefficiently and ineffectively 
in the previous planned economy, in which land use system is mainly based on state 
allocation and the state decides who needs what and how much (Li, 1999). With an 
ideology of setting up a socialist market economy with China’s characteristics, land 
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resource has been in great need of institutional mechanism to make the best use for 
the whole nation and people. Before the economic reform and open door policy 
were initiated, all most all taxes and profits were remitted to the central treasury and 
then transferred back to local government according to expenditures planned and 
approved by the state (Zhu, 1999). Control of revenue resources was one of the 
essential components of the centrally controlled planning system (Huang, 1996). 
Thus, the urban land reform has also been a process of shifting in the central-local 
government relationship. 
 
In the transitional process from planned economy to market-led orientation, land 
allocation system depends on a set of market mechanisms in which competitiveness 
for different land uses is according to the benefit from certain land use, and proper 
government policies and regulations in the land reform. Urban land reform in China 
has been progressing towards the objectives of maintaining socialist public 
ownership of land, protecting and developing land resources and making rational 
use of land to promote sustainable development of the society and the economy. The 
granting of LURs has already become an important way to raise revenue for both 
central and local governments. At the same time, changing fiscal arrangements 
between the central and local governments have been tried and driven by fiscal 
decentralization (Zhu, 1999). The main source of the government income, which is 
the shared revenues1, is divided between the central and local governments. In 
                                                        
1 The fiscal system has classified three types of taxes: central fixed revenues, local fixed revenues and shared 
revenues (Zhu, 1999). 
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1980s, 80 percent of the revenues from the shared taxes were allocated to the central 
and 20 percent to local governments. While in late 1980s and early 1990s, local 
governments are given more portion of the share revenue by decentralized fiscal 
control. The foremost objective of the central-local governments’ fiscal arrangement 
was to maintain a balance between national unity and local economic growth, the 
equality in regional development and efficiency in resource allocation (Zhu, 1999). 
In this sense, the central-local intergovernmental fiscal relationships have undergone 
periodic changes in accordance with the development of economic reforms. These 
changes are also embodied in the process of urban land reform and public land 
leasing towards market orientations. 
3.2.1 The Era Before Economic Reform in China  
Since the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took power and set up the People’s 
Republic of China in 1949, land reform has been one of the most important and 
fundamental tasks for the new communist government. The massive-scale 
nationalization of land was carried out based on the ideology that all land resources 
were common property and administered by the government on behalf of all the 
people. In 1950, the People’s Republic of China Land Reform Law was announced 
and covered the issue such as reform policy and its implementation, the confiscation 
of land, the redistribution of the land, policy towards special land use problems, the 
classification of land in rural areas and land taxations. It should be noted that 1950 
Land Reform Law only applied to rural China in order to confiscate land which 
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landlords rented out to exploit peasants and those surplus land from the rich farmers. 
Urban land and urban fringe land reforms followed the 1950 Urban and Urban 
Fringe Land Reform Regulations, according to which all urban and urban fringe 
land was to become state-owned land according without compensation and then 
administered by the people’s governments of different levels. The Land Reform Law 
and Urban and Urban Fringe Land Reform Regulations of 1950 have provided legal 
foundations for the socialist economy, as well as the ideology for the land tenure 
system in the economy. The nation-wide confiscation of land finished in 1956 and 
later on nationalized urban land use system prevailed until the economic reform and 
open door policy initiated the economic transition from planned economy into 
market-led orientation. Between 1950s and 1980s, the main characteristics of land 
tenure system in urban China could be summarized as follows (Li, 1999): 
 
1. The plan-controlled land use system and administrative allocation of land. The 
allocation of land for different land uses was determined by the land 
administrative authorities of various levels of people’s governments. For the use 
of the state authorities, armed forces, schools or state enterprises, land was 
obtained according to specified administrative and political procedures and 
granted free of charge rather than purchasing it on the market or leasing it. 
Figure 3.1 has illustrated the land allocation process prior to the economic 
reforms. The potential land users of the allocated land only had to apply to build 
and submit a land use application to the provincial (or higher) level of the 
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government. The land administrative authorities would review the application 
according to economic development plans and negotiate with the potential land 
user on the details on the land parcel. Approved granting of LURs would be then 
issued to the land users. 
2. Land use without compensation. Land allocated for the state authorities, armed 
forces schools or state enterprises were free of charge, and no land rent or land 
use fees are levied on it. Meanwhile, the period of time over which the granted 
land could be used was not specified, and if no legal document and no state 
construction was planned on the parcel the land user could occupy the land for 
an unlimited of time. 
3. Limited right to transfer. As the land was granted free of charge by the state, 
there are limitations on land user’s right to sell, lease, mortgage, donate, 
exchange or perform any other act of land transfer to other parties or individuals. 
If land users no longer need a particular piece of land, it had to be returned to the 
relevant state department or land authorities so that the land could be 
re-allocated to other users, although there were rare cases in the previous land 
system. 
 
Before the economic reform policies were initiated, urban land in China was de 
facto free goods and was not regarded as an economic asset. Li (1999) identified 
that as the foundations of the prevailing socialist planning ideology at the time, the 




Figure 3.1 Land Allocation Process Prior to 1979 
 
Source: Zhu, 1999 
 
First, although all land resources were owned and administered by the people’s 
government on behalf of all the people, there was great ambiguity in property rights 
as who has the real control over the land. Land allocation is more of the product of 
political negotiation and distribution according to hierarchical power within the 
large administrative jurisdiction. Land users’ demand for land could be unlimited 
because land was free (Deng, 2003). Land was allocated according to land user’s 
investment plan or needs, and the site selection or allocation of land was negotiated 
and determined between users and land authorities as well as planning departments 
based on the land use master plan. Thus it was common that governments, large 
state-owned enterprises and even armed forces occupied a lot of land for a long 
period of time and it was very difficult for the governments themselves to reallocate 
the land to other users.  
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Second, the system of free and administrative allocation of urban land appears 
economically irrational and tends to be inefficient. Under the predominant state 
ownership and administrative planning system, individual initiatives were largely 
suppressed, and the market demand was distorted or even ignored by the rigid 
top-down controls. The absence of land markets was blamed for having profoundly 
impaired the internal efficiency and productivity of the former socialist cities 
(Bertaud and Renaud, 1994). In planned economies, the state usually decides the 
allocation of economic resources and the cost of getting these resources. Since land 
users in this system do not need or have the incentives to improve their economic 
efficiency as their counterparts in market economy, the allocation of land was not 
based on the economic principles and price mechanisms. Therefore the allocation of 
urban land was affected by the bargaining force of politics and administrative 
jurisdiction, rather than economic efficiency and productivity (Deng, 2003). 
 
Third, the planned land use system has been influencing government behavior in 
land allocation and land use regulations and public finance. There was no stable 
revenue source for the government to carry out urban construction and development 
before economic reform due to the government’s heavy subsidies on industrial 
productions. This also impeded the government provision of urban infrastructure 
and public services to the residents in the cities, and thus resulted in the failure of 
raising living quality for the urban residents. Under the circumstances how to 
finance public infrastructure and raise revenue sources for governments have 
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become the major problems in the process of economic reform and transition. 
 
Fourth, the administrative allocation system has resulted in the characteristic urban 
structure and spatial development pattern. The absolute and strict state ownership of 
urban land under the centrally controlled socialist economic system has also led to a 
dramatically different structure of socialist cities. During the rapid industrialization, 
there was a high percentage of industrial land use in most Chinese cities and 
factories could occupy the core areas of the cities for a long period of time, which 
remained a severe difficulty to redevelop or renovate the old areas. 
 
These inherent problems of the state land allocation system which could not catch 
up with the economy transition into market orientation have greatly spurred the need 
and objectives for the reform of existing land use system. A reform program for the 
urban land market has to be initiated in order to devise a market solution to confirm 
sate land ownership for this valuable asset, while improving market efficiency of the 
urban land use system. In a word, the need for urban land reform has risen with the 
commencement of overall economic reform and rapid urbanization in China and 
stepped into a new development stage in the late 1970s.  
3.2.2 Urban Land Reform in an Economy of Transition: From Central 
Planning to Market Orientation  
Urban land reform in China did not start until the overall economic reforms and 
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open door policy spread throughout China and advanced into a new period in late 
1980s. The negative consequences of the previous state land allocation system have 
hindered the progress in economy reform and could not be compatible with the rapid 
urban developments. As one of the most important productive factors, land 
resources have to be used in accordance with economic principles in order to 
provide the state with a source of revenue and to increase the efficiency of land use. 
With the objective of reforming existing administrative allocation system to a 
market-led orientation in the urban land reform, a number of pioneer practices and 
schemes have been exercised in some open coastal areas such as Shenzhen, 
Guangzhou, Shanghai and Tianjin during late 1980s. Some successful cases have 
provided buttresses to the transformation in ideological and legal aspects. 
 
Late 1980s and early 1990s witnessed a series of legal and policy changes on land 
reform, which included The Land Administration Law (1986), the Chinese 
Constitution (amended in 1988, Clause 4 of Article 10), the Provisional Regulation 
of Land Use Taxation on the State Owned Land in Cities and Towns of P.R.China 
(1988), and the Provisional Regulations on the Conveyance, Granting and 
Transferring of the State Land’s Use Rights in Cities and Towns (1991), which 
replaced the former free land use rights system (tudi wuchang shiyong zhidu) with a 
priced land use rights system (tudi youchang shiyong zhidu) and developed a new 
land use system in which land use rights (LURs, normally 70 years for residential 
use, 40 years for commercial use and 50 years for industrial and mixed uses) on 
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state owned land were separated from ownership rights and could be sold, 
transferred, mortgaged, leased and subleased, and donated. A milestone in China’s 
urban land reform was the first LURs sale in Shenzhen on September 9th 1987, 
when Shenzhen municipal government sold the LURs of a plot of 5000 square 
meters to a local company at a price of RMB 200 per square meter for a lease term 
of 50 year. It was therefore creative to implement public land leasing and introduce 
LURs and make LURs crucial instrument for the market mechanism and wider 
economic reforms, which have greatly shifted the history of Chinese land use 
system and spread public land leasing throughout China since then. There are also 
profound impacts on urban development as well as social and spatial patterns in 
Chinese cities as China saw rapid development of real estate and housing sectors, 
restructuring of public finance, the offering of urban infrastructures and public 
services and the undertaking of massive urban development and redevelopment 
(Ding, 2003). 
 
As a most significant step, LURs reform has met certain objectives of the urban land 
reform and the overall economic development, including the following: 
 
1. To improve the efficiency and the effectiveness of land use system and to 
enhance the land resource management and administration in the interest of 
overall economic development and prompt to set up a series of market 
mechanisms for LURs and require the release of state-owned land into the 
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market. As a result of the reforms, land is regarded as an important financial 
asset that could be traded and exchanged in an open market with certain amount 
of land use fee as payment or compensation.  
2. The government and land administrative could manage the supply of land in 
such a way as to strengthen the states’ macroeconomic reform control over the 
market. With development of the instrument of LURs and the market 
mechanism of its conveyance, the state as the owner and supplier of the land to 
some extent can assure that land use policy can coordinate with other 
macroeconomic policies in the economic reform.  
3. To raise revenues from public land leasing and the sales of LURs in the 
emerging land market. Such income is a very important source of public finance, 
local support, especially for the urban infrastructural development, and 
increments of investments and economic development. In some sense, local 
governments are the driving forces behind China’s urban land reform (Deng, 
2003) and they have benefited a lot form leasing out the land and the sales of 
LURs to raise revenue for the governments as the market economy and foreign 
investment expanded. 
 
The Land Administration Law and other regulations have dealt with the general 
issues of LUR reform and laid legal foundation for the creation of a market system 
for urban land when the urban land reform was initiated in late 1980s and early 
1990s. However, the policymakers have adopted a gradualist approach, while in 
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practice the old administrative allocation system and new approaches of public land 
leasing have been coexisting since the beginning of the urban land reform. 
Implementation of the new land use system has not been thorough, despite the fact 
that the free land use is walking out of the history. During 1990s there was still a 
large proportion of LURs conveyance through administrative allocation. In 1994, 
the ratio of market sale of LURs to administrative allocation was 25% in the number 
of cases and 64% in the number of area through out the whole country, while the 
numbers in 1997 were 36% and 48%, respectively (Yeh and Wu, 2005). The degree 
of marketization of urban land has been increasing and more LURs have been sold 
through the market system, despite that administrative allocation remained the major 
means in sales of LURs for a long period of time. Given the fact that central 
legislation might not be able to take all local variations into consideration, the 
general policy and guidelines of the national legislation are often amended 
according to the special needs of the locality which may differ by various objectives. 
In a word, the changeover from the old land allocation system to a market 
mechanism was a gradual process, and relatively few LURs were sold on the market 
and the move towards the market varied in time and different localities (Li, 1999).  
 
The coexisting of previous administrative allocation of land and the public land 
leasing has created a dual land market system in China since early 1990s (Yeh and 
Wu, 1997). The interactions of the dual-track system have great impact on the urban 
development in China. It is different from the pure market economies where there is 
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only one land market with free transactions (Yeh, 2005). On one hand, it is very 
common that the government officials allocate land to the land users, mainly the 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) or other work units, through administrative 
allocation. On the other hand, the public land leasing system in the urban land 
reform has provided the local government a new a substantial source of revenue 
which was not available in the past. Land could be leased to foreign investors and 
local developers for industrial, residential and commercial uses. Land users pay a 
lump sum fee for the land lease and revenue obtained from the land leasing is used 
to improve urban infrastructures and public services. This will also increase land 
value and thus increase government revenue which can provide further financial 
sources for the urban development. In late 1980s and early 1990s China's local 
governments began to experiment with transforming the administrative allocation 
system of urban land into the one based on public land leasing. Since then, and 
especially after adoption of the Land Administration Law in 1992, China's urban 
land reform has been accelerated, creating a rapidly growing real estate market that 
is now transforming China's urban landscape. 
3.3 Urban Land Reform and Public Land Leasing in Beijing  
3.3.1 Economic Development and Real Estate Market in Beijing 
Beijing is home to over 15 million people and has a long-lasting history of over 
2000 years. Total land area in Beijing is 16,410 km2 and it has been the capital city 
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for several dynasties in ancient China. The Beijing municipal government 
administers 18 counties or districts. Four of them called inner city district are: 
Xicheng, Dongcheng, Chongwen, and Xuanwu. These four districts just slightly 
exceed Beijing’s defense walls that were destroyed during the Cultural Revolution. 
The boundaries of Beijing defense walls also delineate the “old city”, which was the 
capital for both Ming and Qing dynasties. Another four districts called outer city 
district are Haidian, Chaoyang, Fengtai, and Shijingshan. These four districts were 
the primary areas of land development from late 1970s. These eight districts cover 
the majority of the planned areas in Beijing city. Suburb areas that are close to city 
in Daxing, Tongzhou, Shunyi, Mentougou, and Changping also experienced land 
development on a smaller scale than in the four outer city districts. The remaining 
counties (Fangshan, Pinggu, Huairou, Miyun, and Yanqing) were considered to be 
far suburbs and had far less economic connections with the city core.  
With the rapid economic development nationwide since the reform and open door 
policy was implemented, Beijing has been experiencing rapid economic growth and 
urbanizations during the past decades. Beijing municipal government has invested 
massively in infrastructure and follows relatively strict symmetric pattern centering 
Tiananmen Square in ancient times. With the urban development in the past years 
and the evolution of city function, the economic center known as CBD has come 
into being in the Chaoyang District which is 5-10 kilometers from Tiananmen 
Square. City’s expressways also known as Ring Roads are concentric rectangles to 
Tiananmen Square. The fifth ring road is already open and sixth ring is currently 
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under construction. In addition, the subway system expanded farther to the east, 
significantly reducing the commuting time to the city core. A large number of urban 
constructions were initiated after Beijing’s successful bid for the 2008 Olympic 
Games, which would have outstanding impact on housing and land markets in 
Beijing. During this period, GDP per capita and household disposable income have 
both doubled as people benefit from the economic development and also boost the 
demand for housing consumptions. With rising housing standard and the inevitable 
population growth in Beijing, the demand for real estate development and 
improvement of public infrastructure has been kept in a high level.  
 
Real estate development has resulted in an increasing demand for land. In 2005, the 
total amount of real estate investment has reached RMB 152.5 billion and 
undergone an average annual growth rate of 40% in the past 20 years. The reform 
and open door policy have allowed more private especially foreign capital to 
participate in the real estate development. In the1990s Beijing real estate market 
experienced a rapid growth and kept pushing up the property prices. The booming of 
real estate developments in mid 1990s was largely due to an active financial policy 
and the large flow of foreign investment into the China’s real estate market (Deng, 
2005) and there was a sharp increase in real estate investment in 1995. In the past 
five years Beijing has already witnessed a relative slow down in the real estate 
investment as the vacancy rate kept going up with the over-supply of housing stock, 
however, there is still an fast-growing housing markets in Beijing and the 
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government has already implement a series of policies to ‘stabilize the housing 
prices and promote a healthy real estate market’. 
 




(in 10,000 persons) Land Area (sq.km)
Population Density 
(persons/sq.km) 
Dongcheng 61.2 25.38 24113 
Xicheng 75.7 31.62 23940 
Chongwen 35.8 16.52 21670 
Xuanwu 53 18.91 28133 
Chaoyang 171.1 455.08 4742 
Fengtai 97.4 305.8 3185 
Shijingchan 35 84.32 4150 
Haidian 191.8 431 4450 
Mentougou 23.8 1450.7 165 
Fangshan 78.4 1989.54 394 
Tongzhou 62.9 906.28 694 
Shunyi 55.9 1019.89 548 
Changping 48.2 1343.54 359 
Daxing 56.6 1036.32 546 
Pinggu 42.5 950.13 447 
Huairou 30.3 2122.62 143 
Miyun 44.2 2229.45 198 
Yanqing 27.6 1993.75 139 






































































GDP (in billion USD) Annual Growth Rate
 Note: the numbers in the figures are all in nominal terms 
     1 US dollar = 8.07 RMB as on December 31st, 2005 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China and EIU, 2006 
 
 

























GDP (in billion Yuan) Annual Growth Rate 
Note: the numbers in the figures are all in nominal terms 
     1 US dollar = 8.07 RMB as on December 31st, 2005 
Source: Beijing Statistics Bureau, 2006 
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1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Year
GDP per capita (Yuan) Household Annual Disposable Income (Yuan)
 Note: the numbers in the figures are all in nominal terms 
      1 US dollar = 8.07 RMB as on December 31st, 2005 
Source: Beijing Statistical Yearbook, 2004 
 













































































REI (in billon Yuan) REI Annual Growth Rate
 
Note: the numbers in the figures are all in nominal terms 
      1 US dollar = 8.07 RMB as on December 31st, 2005 
Source: Beijing Statistics Bureau, 2006 
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Note: the numbers in the figures are all in nominal terms 
Source: Beijing Statistical Yearbook, 2005 
3.3.2 Urban Land Reform and Public Land Leasing in Beijing 
Urban land markets in Beijing did not start to emerge until 1992 as the first case of 
ground lease in Beijing took place. The city leased eight parcels of land in Shangdi 
Information Industry Base, an economic development zone in Haidian District. The 
Beijing city government now has an estimated average income of about 3 billion 
yuan (US$ 375 million) from land leasing each year. In the first years there are very 
few cases of land use rights (LURs) sales as the urban land market in Beijing was 
emerging and public land leasing was just initiated. The number of sales of LURs 
was less than 70 lots sold from 1993-1996 but on average reached over 300 lots 
from 1997 to 2000. From 2002 to 2005, the average number of land parcels leased 
every year has jumped to over 800 lots (Figure 3.7) and the prosperity in public land 
leasing is closely related to the rapid urban development. The majority of land lease 
are of residential land uses while commercial and office uses are in smaller scale 
than that of residential development. Through the sales of LURs, the Beijing city 
government has expected to obtain fiscal revenue to facilitate urban development.  
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Given the social political system in China and the importance as the nation’s capital, 
Beijing plays a unique role in the relationship with central government. On one hand, 
the strong role of central government in China’s economy has drawn the attention of 
private foreign investors to the capital city. This is potentially strengthened by good 
urban infrastructure and public services. The fast growing economy has brought 
Beijing with high demand for real estate which is based on the comparative 
advantage as the national capital (Deng, 2003). On the other hand, the presence of 
the central government also imposes more constraints on Beijing’s urban land 
reform process. As the political center of the socialist country, Beijing usually 
follows closely with the central government’s policies and very few institutional 
innovations have started here. Because of the complicated political relations there 
may be a large number of underground deals in the land market and it is very 
difficult to trace the information on land leasing. The city government of Beijing 
appears unable or unwilling to create a more transparent and efficient land market 
since there are more powerful parties than the city itself (Deng, 2003). This dilemma 
faced by Beijing has created a unique test bed for the study of central-local 
government relationship and the political economy in urban land reform in China. A 
comprehensive empirical study on the public land leasing in Beijing is conducted in 
the following sections. 
 
Table 3.2 Leased Land Area and Modes of Public Land Leasing in China, 
2002-2005 
 
Total Land Area Leased 
(in 10,000 hectare) 
Land Lease by  
Negotiation (%) 
Land Lease by Tender 
and Auction (%) Total (%) 
2002 12.42 85.43% 14.57% 100%   
2003 19.36 73.19% 26.81% 100% 
2004 18.15 71.14% 28.86% 100% 
2005 16.32 64.94% 35.06% 100% 
Note: There is a No.71 Document from Ministry of Land Resources of China in early 2004 to 
request for tender and auction in public land leasing and certain portion of planned land leases 
by private negotiation could be granted a buffering period. 
Source: Ministry of Land Resources of China, 2006 
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Source: Ding, 2003 and Beijing Land Assembly and Reserve Center, 2006 
3.4 Public Land Leasing in China: Some Issues  
With the progress of economic reform in China since late 1970s, urban land reform 
has been following a gradual approach towards market mechanism. Although land 
reform has introduced land leasing and the sales of LURs in China, the previously 
administratively allocated land still exists and the administrative land allocation 
system still continues (Xie et al. 2002; Zhang 1997). According to the Land 
Administration Law in 1987, the government owns all urban land in China and 
private parties can lease urban land from the government, then sell or mortgage the 
LURs. Unlike urban land, all farmland belongs to farmer collectives and can not be 
traded, and the government controls the conversion of farmland into urban land and 
has the dominant power to acquire land from farmers with certain amount of 
compensation. Thus, urban land users have to lease the land from local government 
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and land authorities. In the public land leasing, there are several issues that are 
important in understanding the impacts of government behavior on land value in the 
urban land reform in China. These issues include the land price gradient  
3.4.1 Site Density Restriction and Urban Land Value 
Site density restriction which is the ratio of buildable space to lot area on the 
development site1 has long been an important tool of land use regulation. In Beijing, 
the municipal government and its land administrative authorities can set and 
approve density regulations on the particular parcel according to the planning 
principles, while the district government can influence the process. Government 
regulations on site density restriction has also been formulated and adjusted 
according to the demographic and economic development. The restriction on 
maximum allowed development density has a significant impact on land 
development and the land value, as well reflects a set of tradeoffs faced by the land 
administrative authorities and relationship among different levels of government.  
 
In Beijing, fiscal responsibilities and administrative authorities are divided between 
the municipal government and the district governments under its jurisdiction. The 
districts run enterprises, retain tax revenue, support public housing projects and 
provide a number of other public services. Meanwhile, they are also given some 
authority of offering ground lease contracts for land development. The municipal 
                                                        
1 Site density is usually measured by the floor-to-area ratio, FAR, or, plot ratio, PR. 
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government is responsible for mass infrastructure projects and the resettlement of 
residents and factories displace by the redevelopment. However, the net benefit of 
public land leasing and land development is not divided equally between different 
levels of government (Fu and Somerville, 2001) and the change of site density can 
be embodied in the set off tradeoffs faced by the government. Both the district and 
the municipal government have the incentive to loosen restrictions on development 
densities in order to maximize land lease revenues, which they can share. In a word, 
the balance of interests between the different levels of government affects the 
determination of the maximum allowed density and thus has impact on the land 
prices in public land leasing. 
3.4.2 Modes of Urban Land Acquisition in Public Land Leasing  
In the common practice where China has adopted public land leasing since 1990s, 
there are three ways to obtain a land lease: private negotiation, private tender and 
public auction. Private negotiation is the most prevailing approach at the early stage 
of public land leasing and it is a direct negotiation between the land user and the 
local government for the land user to acquire a land parcel over the terms and 
conditions of the land leasing Proposed land uses which usually include public 
facilities, educational institutes, development zones, high-tech and capital-intensive 
manufacturing and other uses deemed applicable by the land authority could obtain 
subsidies from the government in the form of LURs transfer at a discount rate and 
thus land prices need to be negotiated between the land users and the government..  
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In private tender, multiple land users would bid for a parcel of land with a land use 
plan and a price offer in the form of bidding, and the winner may not necessary be 
the highest bidder as there are other qualifications and requirements for the bidders 
rather than the price criteria only. Land acquisition by tender is normally applied to 
licensed property developers who usually conduct commercial developments and it 
is restricted to invited developers. The third way of urban land acquisition is public 
auction. The land leasing by public auction is open to all developers and potential 
land uses interested in the plot which is usually in a prime location for commercially 
profitable uses, and the winner must offer the highest price in order to win the 
competition for the land parcel. The three ways coexist in the public land leasing for 
a long period of time and there has been policy changes by the state in recent years 
to call off the mode of private negotiation in the land leases for commercial uses as 
to improve the transparency and efficiency in urban land market. 
 
The payment for the urban land leasing usually consists of three major parts: 
lump-sum premium, urban infrastructure fee and community infrastructure fee and 
all three components must be paid up front to the land authorities of local 
government at the beginning of the lease. There are also other kinds of fee such as 
land acquisition fee, building demolition and residents’ relocation fees and to be 
paid after obtaining the land lease. Normally, each city has standard guideline on 
land price (also known as benchmark price, BMP), which is set by the municipal 
government for various land grades and different land uses to serve as rudimentary 
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guide for local government. However, most cities rely on some market-based land 
valuation methods to adjust the leasing prices for the changing market condition 
since the BMP is only updated every five years or longer (Deng, 2003). Meanwhile, 
it is also a fact that even though each city may have a standard land price guideline 
or BMPs, the actual land leasing price is often determined by negotiation between 
the local government and developer (except in the case of auction and tender). 
 
In general, public land leasing by negotiation is still the most popular way of selling 
LURs in the Chinese urban land market over the past decade, while auction is the 
least poplar yet fast-developing one at the early beginning of the public land leasing 
(Figure 3.8). In this period, the urban land sales by negotiation gave the local 
authorities maximum control over land prices and the real estate development 
process, yet harmful for the setup of market mechanisms and competition in the 
urban land reform. The public land leasing by tender and auction to some extent 
reflects the direction of reform in the ways of urban land acquisition and LURs 
transfer. This also corresponded to the development of a market mechanism, and 
there is always a call towards a complete tender and auction system for the sales of 
LURs. In the early 2004, the No.71 Documentation by the State Ministry of Land 
Administration, which requested all the city governments around the country that 
the urban land leased by administrative allocation and private negotiation must all 
be disposed by Aug 31st, 2004 in order to regulate the land supply for the 
overheating real estate market in China, although there is still a portion of planned 
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land leases by private negotiation which could be granted a buffering period. This is 
quite a magnificent regulation change signaling all the urban land except public uses 
must be leased by means of market mechanisms.  
 

















Source: Wu and Yeh, 2005 
3.4.3 Benchmark Land Price and Price Mechanism for Urban Land  
The establishment of the price mechanism for urban land has shaped one of the most 
distinct features of the urban land reform in China as land has no value or price in 
the former planned economy. Instead of replacing the old system as whole, the 
intention of the reform program is “to establish a framework that will facilitate a 
compromise between China’s socialist ideology and the market mechanism” (Li, 
1999). Thus the land authorities have been working on developing the guidelines for 
urban land pricing that reflect the official view as well as adjusting for market 
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factors on the pricing behavior of urban land leasing and the allocation of land for 
various uses.  
 
In the initial stage of the setup of urban land price mechanism, the local government 
had to establish a market reference point for the average land prices in each city so 
the local land authorities would at hand have a set of guidelines of land prices which 
means a benchmark price (BMP) for various land grades and land uses, when selling 
LURs to the land users. A BMP is the average price level established within a 
specific time period in a particular area/locality for a particular land use and can be 
adjusted according to land use planning guidelines as well as market transactions. 
BMPs allow local governments both to estimate the price of different grades of 
urban land based on location, land use and other factors, and make corresponding 
adjustment for other site-specific factors when evaluating individual land parcels. 
 
BMPs exist as well for the sharing of revenues among different levels of the 
government. The formation of BMPs can be examined in a more systematic way 
through an interpretation of the extent to which the official view on land price 
behavior in the urban land reform and it is affected by the socialist concepts and 
other political goals other than economic principles. Meanwhile the BMPs may vary 
according to heterogeneity of urban land market in different cities and “the nature of 
BMPs in China is always a component-structure rather than a single sum” (Li, 1999). 
In practice, there may be a deviation between BMPs and the actual land leasing 
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price as the political view of urban land prices and the market price mechanism 
differ. Thus, when the market reform generates enough activities there would be a 
more comprehensive understanding of the market comparables and price behaviors 
in the land market reform. 
3.5 Summary 
China has been experiencing a transitional process in both social and economical 
reform from previous planned ideology to market orientation. In the city level, the 
central-local government relationship has great impact on the economic reform and 
public land leasing. As the national capital, Beijing is involved in a complex 
political ecology and has its unique practice of public land leasing and urban land 
reform in the economy of transition. Based on the empirical study of public land 
leasing in Beijing, this thesis tried to examine the process of urban land reform in 
China and the determinants of price mechanism in the public land leasing. Among 
the impacting factors, site density restrictions and the mode of urban land 
acquisition serve as important factors in the land leasing prices and these factors are 
driven by a set of incentives of the land administration authorities and local 
governments. By measuring the effects of allowed plot ratio and other factors on the 
land prices, we may see how the incentives of governments on land use regulation 
and the land use regulations may affect market outcome in the urban development 
and redevelopment in Beijing. The study of land price determinants could also be 
great value for the evaluation of the land asset and examination of housing price 
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behaviors in Chinese cities. In addition, this study could also make contributions of 
policy implications for urban land reform and urbanization process in China the 





















CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND EMPIRICAL 
MODEL SELECTION 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an analytical framework to answer the research questions and 
formulate a hedonic price model to test the hypothesis derived from the conceptual 
framework. The related literatures reviewed in the previous chapter on property 
price gradients and how government policy affect land value in urban land reform in 
China provide foundations to the empirical modeling and variable selection to 
achieve more accurate estimation and statistical inference. Generally, urban spatial 
and neighborhood characteristics and measurement of government policy and 
regulation are included in the empirical model. 
4.2 Conceptual Framework 
4.2.1 Price Gradients and Urban Land Market 
The value of properties has long been shown to be dependent on location. Von 
Thunen (1826) first explained the importance of location on the value of property 
and found out that if there is a central marketplace in a farming area, where 
transactions of agricultural products are concentrated, then it saves commuting costs 
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for the farmers to travel between their farmland and the central marketplace. He also 
put forward the classical model that predicts a negative land-rent gradient, by which 
the rent for farmland will decrease as the distance to the marketplace increases, to 
compensate for higher transportation costs. This early spatial theory of agriculture 
was then modernized by Alonso (1964), who proposed the bid-rent curve. Instead of 
examining the market for farmland, Alonso's bid-rent model discusses the housing 
market in terms of a monocentric assumption. A central business district (CBD) is 
the marketplace at which jobs and other economic activities are concentrated; and 
each of the households should have at least one member who needs to travel 
frequently between the residential location and the CBD. The level of utility of each 
household was expressed as a function of the amount of land (housing) the 
household occupies, the amount of all other goods they own and the distance from 
which they must travel to reach the CBD. Alonso defined the bid-rent function as 
the set of prices (the bids) the household would offer for land at different distances 
to the CBD, holding the utility at a constant level. As such, this model predicts that 
the bid-rent curve should have a negative slope. Since then, a large body of 
literature, including a vast number of empirical studies, has emerged to test the 
predictability of urban spatial theory by applying hedonic regressions and repeat 
sales models. 
 
In the empirical analysis of this study, the urban land reform Beijing is studied as a 
case based on the assumption of a monocentric city with a single focal point, the 
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CBD in Chaoyang districts. The literature on property price gradients reviewed in 
the previous section has followed the monocentric assumption as they examined the 
case of Beijing. It is thus expected in the empirical analysis that the bid rent declines 
with the distance to the central point. In this case of a transition economy to market 
orientations, the sign of the land price gradient could be hypothesed to be negative 
by using hedonic regression models to measure the accessibility of the land to the 
economic center.  
4.2.2 Government Policies in Urban Land Reform in China 
4.2.2.1 Fiscal Decentralization and Inter-governmental Relationship 
A well-functioning fiscal system is essential if market is to replace controls 
(Agarwala, 1992). The practice in China is showing that the unsettled fiscal relations 
underlie central-local conflicts, which is that the state government needs sufficient 
revenues to achieve the goals in national affairs whereas local governments want to 
acquire financial sources for the urban infrastructure and local development. Local 
governments are given certain fiscal autonomy, and they have the incentives to 
attract more fiscal revenue through sales of LURs and retain the profit for their own 
purposes. In this context, it becomes understandable why for a long period of time 
that the local governments preferred to transfer LURs in private negotiations as they 
may have the privilege to dispose the revenue from the sales of LURs. Site density 
restrictions could serve as an instrument to promote land leasing price as it allows 
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increase with the development density.  
 
Land is owned by the state in Chinese cities and different levels of government are 
involved in the public land leasing process. In terms of administrative powers, 
county or district governments usually can approve land leases of less than 10 mu 
(about 0.247 acre). The competence of city government with respect to land leasing 
also has an upper limit, which depends on the administrative level of the city. 
Proposals for the leasing of land tracts exceeding this limit must be approved by the 
central government. With respect to revenue sharing the LURs sales, in the early 
1990s, the central government attempted to seize 30 percent of the land-leasing 
revenues collected by local governments, and a law was enacted to this effect. 
However, the central government found this legislation difficult to implement 
because local governments were able to conceal much of their land-leasing revenue. 
As a result, the new Land Law amended in 1998, no longer requires local 
governments to cede to the center a portion of their land-leasing revenues from 
existing urban land. On the other side, the ground leases approved by local 
governments have not only attracted private or largely oversee capital to land 
developments but also brought local governments with fiscal revenues to finance 
urban infrastructure and pay for the resettlement of the local residents because of the 
development of the projects. In Beijing, which is the capital city and one of the 
direct-governed cities (Zhi Xia Shi) in China, fiscal responsibilities and 
administrative authorities are divided between the municipal government and the 
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district governments under its jurisdiction. The fiscal incentives facing local 
governments have promoted real estate developments within their jurisdictions. As a 
central tool of land use regulations, Restrictions on the site density, in terms of plot 
ratio allowed on the site, are usually driven by the set of incentives and impact on 
the land leasing price and the thus the fiscal revenue attained by the local 
governments. In this sense, one hypothesis could be that the tighter constraint on site 
density (allowed FAR) can result in higher land leasing prices as it increase land 
revenue to finance different levels of government. Empirical tests will be conducted 
to examine the impact of site density constraint on land leasing prices in Chapter 5. 
4.2.2.2 Government Intervention and Multiple Government Roles  
There is little doubt concerning the efficiency gains from establishing private 
property rights in urban land use, especially compared to the previous planned 
system (Deng, 2003). Two different views exist regarding the role of local 
government in public land leasing. One considers local government involvement to 
be efficient intervention, at least a mean of facilitating economic development in the 
transition economy and several arguments support this point of view (Zhu, 1999; Ho, 
2001). A second view argues against such a rosy interpretation of government 
intervention pointing out many problems in the public land leasing, such as local 
government’s role conflicts and land monopolies. Under the Chinese public land 
leasehold system the government is simultaneously the land owner, provider of 
collective goods and owner and manager of SOEs. There may be a possible conflict 
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of interest for a single entity to play these multiple roles and have impacts on the 
development of a land market (Deng, 2003). In general, excessive governmental 
intervention in transition economies is regarded to be inefficient, especially 
compared with a typical market economy.  
 
In China the multiple roles of the government may pose problems to public land 
leasing. Unlike private firms that always trying to maximize profit, there is no single 
objective that can synchronize the multiple roles of the government. Under the 
traditional planned economy, the identities of land user, land owner, firm owner and 
collective goods provider all come into one entity. In this sense, public land leasing 
actually is a step towards separating land users and land owners. It also makes clear 
the different identities of land owner and collective goods provider, even though 
these are part of the same government. 
 
One typical measurement for the government intervention in the development of 
land market is the mode by which government lease land to land users. In previous 
planned land use system, administration allocation and transfer by private 
negotiation are the most prevailing modes of land leasing. With the emerging land 
market sales of LURs by market-led ways such as tender and public auction are 
adopted instead of administrative means. Based on the records of public land leasing 
in Beijing, one hypothesis we try to test is that land lease price by market-led modes 
(by tender or auction) are significant higher than the parcels leased by private 
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negotiation in the developing of urban land market in Beijing. 
4.3 Empirical Model Selection  
In this section, in order to test hypotheses proposed in the previous section, a 
hedonic price model is utilized. With regards to the potential econometric problems, 
a Kriging method is employed in order to achieve efficient estimates and compared 
with the traditional OLS estimates. 
4.3.1 Hedonic Price Model 
Typically, a hedonic price model can be used to model the relationship between the 
property price and hedonic property characteristics using a semi-logarithmic 
functional form (equation ) 
 
logY P X uβ= = +  
 
Where Y is an 1n×  vector of transaction prices, X is an n k× vector with k 
hedonic characteristics about structure, location, neighborhood information and time. 
β  is an 1n×  vector of hedonic coefficients, and u is an 1n×  vector of residuals. 
N is the number of observations.  
 
Although there is no solid theoretical basis on how to choose correct functional form, 
many researchers found that this kind of semi-log form had numerous advantages, 
for example, the variation of marginal hedonic prices, simple coefficient 
interpretation as well as convenient computation, etc. Malpezzi (2002) provides a 
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detailed explanation on the strength of this function form.  
 
Traditionally, researchers assume u to follow an independent identical normal 
distribution (i.i.d) as: 
2~ (0, , )u N Iσ  
Where u has a mean of zero, a constant variance of 2σ  and zero covariance 
between each other which guarantees the independence property of data. Under this 
assumption, OLS proves to be the best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE). 
 
However, empirical data have shown spatial autocorrelation in the hedonic 
regressions. It is well known that the most important factor in real estate is location 
and it is not surprising that spatial effects are likely to be present in any situation in 
which location matters. In housing markets, therefore, spatial effects caused by 
housing price determination process require a representation in economic models 
based on theory or conceptual considerations. When the residuals are spatially 
autocorrelated, { '}E uu = Ω  and the error terms are correlated and violate the 
assumption of independent identical normal distribution. The consequences of 
spatial autocorrelation to OLS estimates are as follows: 
 
1. The OLS estimates are no longer BLUE and will be inefficient, which means the 
variance of estimated coefficients will not be the smallest when compare with 
other linear estimators. As a result, forecasts based on OLS will also be 
inefficient. 
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2. The estimated variances of the hedonic coeffcients will be biased, and hence 
tests of hypothesis are invalid. Meanwhile, if positive correlation among residual 
exist, OLS tends to overestimate the t-statistic in inference. (Gujarati, 2003) 
 
3. The autocorrelation among hedonic residuals means that there are some spatial 
and temporal information which has not been fully incorporated into hedonic 
model and it will cause poorer model fit in expression of a lower R square. 
4.3.2 Geostatistics 
Due to the potential spatial autocorrelation in the estimation, an alternative 
geostatistical approach to measuring neighborhood and accessibility effects was first 
proposed by Dubin (1992). As there are severe measurement problems inherent in 
neighborhood and accessibility variables, these variables can be excluded from the 
set of explanatory variables and model the resulting autocorrelation of the residuals. 
It is well known that omitting relevant variables from the set of explanatory 
variables causes biased and inconsistent estimates. However, measurement error in 
the explanatory variables also causes biased and inconsistent estimates. The 
advantage of the approach used here is that spatial relationships can be taken into 
account explicitly, through the use of Kriging. A detailed explanation of Kriging can 




For the purpose of hypothesis testing in the follow sections of this thesis, estimation 
results from a hedonic regression with OLS estimates and Kriging method are 
compared. As the main objective of the regression analysis is hypothesis testing and 
estimation, rather than forecasting, the statistical inferences could be validated from 




































CHAPTER 5   
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF PUBLIC LAND LEASING IN 
BEIJING 
5.1 Introduction  
The section focuses on the empirical study of Beijing, the capital city of People’s 
Republic of China, to examine the public land leasing process and answer the 
questions arises in our previous analysis. It also presents the empirical results of the 
public land leasing at the both aggregate and disaggregate level  
5.2 Empirical Study of Public Land Leasing in Beijing 
Between 2002 and 2005, the urban land leasing follows certain patterns at the 
aggregate level. Residential land use consists of 40% to 50% of the total land leases, 
while commercial and mixed use occupies the second largest portion (Figure 5.1). 
We use geographic information systems (GIS) to examine the spatial distribution 
pattern of residential land price and the development densities (FAR) on the site to 
better understand the dynamics of the urban spatial structure with respect to urban 
land reform in the emerging land market in Beijing. Figure 5.2 and 5.3 illustrated 
that certain patterns may exist in the spatial structure of residential land market in 
Beijing. The majority of residential land developments concentrate within the third 
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and fourth Ring Road which we categorize these areas into outer districts1 and there 
is a pattern in land development during the past four years and these districts have 
seen more and more land development than the inner districts2 which lack of land 
supply. The intuitive picture in Figure 5.3 demonstrated the spatial pattern of urban 
development and expansion in the past four years with the economic reform and 
development. 
 
Those land development with high unit land price and FAR shown in Figure 5.4, 5.5 
and 5.6 have clustered in the areas such as CBD in Chaoyang District, Financial 
Street in Fuxingmen, Zhongguancun area which accommodates universities, 
research institutes and Hi-Tech companies, Yayuncun which has many large 
residential projects and other areas around major Ring Roads. These areas are 
usually the employment centers with active economic activities and closely related 
to daily lives. The figures of unit land price and FAR by year illustrate a trend of 
sub-urbanization in the unit land price and site development density as more and 
more people choose to live in the outer areas which drives up the demand for houses. 
While in the Figures 5.4, the inner four districts, which are historically old districts 
and surround the Forbidden City, have a number of land leases with high land price, 
yet the FAR is low. This may be due to the development density controls in the inner 
districts for the purpose of historical preservation.  
 
                                                        
1 Four outer districts are Chaoyang, Haidian, Shijingshan and Fengtai. 
2 Four inner districts are Dongcheng, Xicheng, Xuanwu and Chongwen. 
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Source: Beijing Land Assembly and Reserve Center, 2005 
 
Figure 5.2 Residential Land Developments in Beijing, 2002-2005 
 
Note: there are four Ring Roads shown on the map and each dot represents one land lease 
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Figure 5.3 Residential Land Developments in Beijing from 2002 to 2005 
 
Note: there are four Ring Roads shown on the map and each dot represents one land lease 
 
 
Figure 5.4 Spatial Patterns of Unit Land Price and FAR in Beijing, 2002-2005 
Unit Land Price                         FAR 
 
Note: there are four Ring Roads shown on the map and the deepest in color represents the 




Figure 5.5 Spatial Patterns of Unit Land Price in Beijing from 2002 to 2005 
 
Figure 5.6 Spatial Patterns of FAR in Beijing by Year from 2002 to 2005 
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5.2.1 Hedonic Price Model and Hypothesis Testing  
In this section, a hedonic price model is used to test the hypotheses proposed in the 
previous section. Typically, we could model the relationship between the land 
leasing price and hedonic land characteristics using a logarithmic functional form: 
 
log logY P X uβ= = +  
 
Where Y is an 1n×  vector of land leasing prices, X is an n k× vector with k 
hedonic characteristics about structure, location, neighborhood information and time. 
β  is an 1n×  vector of hedonic coefficients, and u is an 1n×  vector of residuals. 
N is the number of observations. A list of variables is listed below. 
 
                      
Table 5.1 Variable Definition 
Variable  Definition Expected  
Sign 
lnPPSM Log of transaction unit land price (total land price 
divided by lot size) of the parcel in land leasing  
     
lnFAR Log of floor-to-land area ration (FAR) as a 
measurement of site density on the land parcel 
    + 
lnLA Log of land area of the lot      + 
(lnLA)sq Quadratic term of log of FAR to allow for 
nonlinearity 
_ 
lnDCBD Log of Distance to the Central Business District of  
Beijing as a measurement of the location attribute 
and price gradient 
_ 
Mode A dummy variable indicating the mode of leasing 
from local government (0 if by private negotiation, 
1 if by tender and auction) 





A dummy variable indicating which one of the 
three categories of administrative districts where 
the land parcel is located. (1 if yes, otherwise 0) 
     
_ 
 
lnFAR*Outer An interactive variable indicating the sensitivity of 
the four outer districts when the FAR varies 
compared with inner ones 
_ 
lnFAR*Suburb An interactive variable indicating the sensitivity of 
the suburb districts when the FAR varies compared 
with inner ones 
_ 
D2002H2 A dummy variable indicating whether the land is 
leased in the second half of the year 2002 (1 if yes, 
otherwise 0)              
 
    + 
D2003H1 A dummy variable indicating whether the land is 
leased in the first half of the year 2003 (1 if yes, 
otherwise 0) 
 
    + 
D2003H2 A dummy variable indicating whether the land is 
leased in the second half of the year 2003 (1 if yes, 
otherwise 0) 
 
    + 
D2004H1 A dummy variable indicating whether the land is 
leased in the first half of the year 2004 (1 if yes, 
otherwise 0) 
 
    + 
D2004H2 A dummy variable indicating whether the land is 
leased in the second half of the year 2004 (1 if yes, 
otherwise 0) 
 
    + 
D2005H1 A dummy variable indicating whether the land is 
leased in the first half of the year 2005 (1 if yes, 
otherwise 0) 
 
    + 
D2005H2 A dummy variable indicating whether the land is 




Policy A dummy variable indicating whether the land is 
leased before or after the policy change in 2004 on 





5.2.2 Research Data and Descriptive Statistics 
It is very difficult in the past to obtain land leasing data, especially the detailed 
information on individual transaction records as the market is not transparent 
enough to disclose the information. These land leasing data are usually considered 
confidential as government officials could be involved in the land leasing process, 
especially in the private negotiation. When the urban land reform marches towards 
the market orientation, there is a call for the disclosure of the land leasing data and 
making the market transactions open and transparent. In 2002, the Land Assembly 
and Reserve Center of Beijing municipal government1 was set up and authorized to 
administer the public land leasing and the land use planning in Beijing. Each land 
lease with detailed information has to be registered in the record of the Land 
Assembly and Reserve Center. The information regarding the specific land parcel is 
reviewed and approved by the center before the land is leased. 
 
Urban land leasing data used in this study consists of 1363 observations of 
residential LURs sales granted by Land Assembly Center of Beijing Municipal 
Government from 2002 to 2005. The land leases of residential land use make up of 
nearly half of the total leases and they constitute land supply for the housing market 
in Beijing. For each site, we know the location, its geographic X-Y coordinates of 
the center point in the parcel for geo-coding, its transaction land price, lot size, 
mode of leasing, the permitted land use type plot ratio to be developed at the site by 
                                                        
1 Official records on the sales of LURs in Beijing has been released and made public on www.bjtd.com. 
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the land authority, time of LURs sale and other characteristics. As we try to look at 
how government behaviors such as site density restriction and different modes of 
land leasing affect land prices, the variables of FAR and Mode are treated as 
exogenous variables to test hypotheses and estimate coefficients based on our 
sample of urban land leasing. Therefore, the impact of government behavior and the 
underlying determinant can be explored and studied.  
                    Table 5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
                 
 Min Max Mean Std. Dev. 
Land Area (M2) 330 383470 28592.56 38681.25 
Price Per Square Meter 
(￥/ M2) 27.84 37750.72 1880.95 2370.73 
FAR 0.37 19.06 3.46 2.25 
Dis. To CBD (km) 0.14 49.52 10.53 5.70 
Population Density  
by District (Persons/KM2) 177.00 34027.00 8055.32 9559.98 
Note: * 1 US dollar = 8.07 RMB as on December 31st, 2005 
                      
5.2.3 Empirical Specifications 
In this study, hedonic price model is expressed as: 
Y = f (site characteristics, location attributes, government behavior, temporal effect) 
Here Y is the unit land leasing price for the parcel, and the explanatory variables 
include Distance-to-CBD as the measurement for price gradient, FAR and Mode of 
land leasing as a proxy of the impact of government behavior on land prices and 
public land leasing, the interactive variables of lnFAR*Outer and lnFAR*Suburb 
which served as the measurements for the sensitivity of constraint of development 
density facing different local districts. Time dummy variables are also used to 
indicate the time effect on the land prices.  
 78 
Table 5.3 Descriptive Statistics of Unit Land Price and FAR by mode of land leasing, 2002-2005 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 
 Mode of Land Leasing Mode of Land Leasing Mode of Land Leasing Mode of Land Leasing 
 Negotiation  Tender and Auction Negotiation Tender and Auction Negotiation Tender and Auction Negotiation  Tender and Auction 
PPSM(￥/M2) 1746.83 (1720.5) 2306.46 (1870.3) 2258.75 (2187.11) 2311.58 (2152.04) 1708.42 (2931.75) 1628.72 (2653.90) 1642.49 (1731.54) 2448.94 (4034.06) 
FAR 3.21 (1.58) 3.82 (1.87) 4.21 (2.69) 4.07 (2.10) 2.69 (1.75) 2.55 (1.83) 3.32 (1.93) 3.62 (3.20) 
Note: standard deviations are in the parentheses. 
Table 5.4 Residential Land Leases by Mode and District in Beijing, 2002-2005 




Tender and  
Auction Inner  Outer  Suburb 
Total Number 
 
2002 218 (78.5%) 60 (21.5%) 83 (30.4%) 181 (64.8%) 14 (4.8%) 278 
2003 345 (75.2%) 115 (24.8%) 98 (21.6%) 305 (66.1%) 57 (12.3%) 460 
2004 264 (79.9%) 66 (20.1%) 86 (26.5%) 231 (70.1%) 13 (3.3%) 330 
2005 178 (60.3%) 117 (39.7%) 24 (8.1%) 250 (84.7%) 21 (7.2%) 295 
Total Number 1005(73.7%) 358 (26.3%) 291(21.3%) 967 (70.9%) 105 (7.8%) 1363 
Note: the percentage numbers are in the parentheses. 
Inner Districts refer to four central districts Dongcheng, Xicheng, Chongwen, Xuanwu, and four outer districts are Chaoyang, Haidian, 
Shijingshan and Fengtai. Suburb districts usually refer to Daxing, Tongzhou, Shunyi, Mentougou, and Changping.
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5.2.4 Justification of OLS and Kriging Estimates 
The OLS and Kriging estimates have little difference in the estimated coefficients, 
however, the standard errors in Kriging estimate are generally smaller than the OLS 
estimates. In this manner, the t-statistic in Kriging may differ from those in OLS 
estimates and show more coefficients with statistical significance in the estimates. 
The geostatistical model could make hypothesis testing and thus statistical inference 
more reliable. Moreover, the prediction accuracy of the geostatistical method could 
be increased as the MSE and Theil’sU in Kriging is 1.4110 and 0.1032, respectively, 
which shows smaller sum of square errors compared with OLS estimates (see 
Appendix). When employing geostatistical model, it is important to use a large 
sample as it could represent all the portions of the study area and then lead to more 
accurate predictions. The full sample is divided into two sub samples (2002-2003 
and 2004-2005) to see the change of impact of FAR and mode of leasing on the land 
prices. In this sense, with the availability of more LURs transaction data, the 
geostatistical models will have its advantage in estimation and prediction accuracy 
and the reliability of statistical inference.  
5.2.5 Interpretation of Regression Results 
Main goal of this empirical analysis is to identify the impacts of constraint in 
development density on the urban land value, through which land use regulations of 
government affect the market outcome. Meanwhile, based on the sample estimation 
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the mode of land leasing has significant impact on land prices and reflects the 
transition process in urban land reform. Based on the monocentric assumption, the 
result on price gradient and spatial pattern can also be justified in the empirical 
testing. Coefficients of independent variables are estimated in the regression results.  
 
(1) Estimate the impacts of land price gradients  
 
In this part, coefficients of Distance to CBD, FAR and other variables on unit land 
price are estimated with OLS and Kriging methods, respectively. Land prices 
decrease with the increase of distance to CBD and there is a negative impact of 
distance-to-CBD of 0.15% on the unit land prices. Fu and Somerville (2001) found 
out the marginal effect of 0.07% of distance-to-CBD on land price per buildable 
area using Shanghai land leasing data. In Ding’s study (2003), for the land of all 
uses leased in Beijing during 1993 and 2000, the coefficient of distance-to-CBD 
ranged from -0.16 to -0.22 and the coefficient of residential land use was -0.12. The 
empirical results have confirmed the negative price gradient and the relationship 
between the land prices and the accessibility to the workplace.  
 
(2) Estimate the impacts of government land use regulations and behaviors on 
land price  
The sign of coefficient of FAR is positive and significant, in which constraints on 
site density would result in higher land prices, with other things constant. The 
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marginal impact of variation in FAR will be 0.86 % increases in land price. The 
result is consistent with that in Fu and Somerville’s (2001) study and the 
development density has a positive effect on land value. Regarding to the mode of 
land leasing, it has been long that negotiation prevails in public land leasing 
between government and the user of land. The transition of land leasing mode from 
negotiation to market mechanism has brought significant premium in land prices. It 
shows that the price of land lease by tender and auction is roughly 20% significantly 
higher than the ones by negotiation as public land leasing through market 
mechanism will be more sensitive to the cost and benefit from the land leasing. It is 
a major advancement on the land allocation and valuation system in the evolution of 
land market as more and more emphasis are on land valuation and leasing of land 
through market channels rather than underground negotiations. Government of 
different local districts may not have uniform sensitivity towards the effect of FAR 
change on the land price. The coefficients of lnFAR*Outer and lnFAR*Suburb are 
-0.0556 and -1.4595 in Kriging estimate, respectively, both are of expected signs. 
This means inner districts will be most sensitive to the change of FAR as they are 
the in city core and possess few land for development. The policy or historical 
preservation which poses strict FAR controls will also add to the impact. As the 
outer and suburb districts have more land available for development, they may not 
be so keen as to impose rigid restrictions on development density. In this sense, 
when local governments of different considerations on the FAR controls are 
competing for the same development project, they may have different incentives to 
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attract the investment and thus inter-governmental competition may exist. 
 
Compared with the impacts of FAR mode of leasing on land prices in 2002-2003, 
2004-2005 witnessed an increase of the effects by 3 % and 11 % respectively. The 
No.71 Documentation issued by the state Ministry of Land Resources in early 2004 
has significant influence on the mode of land leasing and thus affect the government 
behavior and land prices in public land leasing. In order to promote a transparent 
land market and prevent the underground transaction of land, this documentation 
provide a guideline for the mode of land leasing in the un ban land reform and 
mandate the local governments to lease public land through market mechanisms. 
This has reflected the government behavior affect the land leasing price and the 
process of urban land reform to a greater extent in the context of the economy of 
transition. Meanwhile, when the land users want to acquire land parcel, they have to 
consider more about the government regulation and the mechanism through which 
the land is leased. 
 
(3) Estimate the temporal effect on land price 
 
The coefficients estimated for the half-year dummy variables are shown in the table. 
Except for the second half of 2004 and the second half of 2005, others are all 
statistically significant. By estimating the coefficient of time dummies, we may be 
able to capture the dynamics of urban land market as the price is quality-controlled 
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and to construct a price index for the reference of land leasing prices and the urban 
land market. A policy dummy variable indicating whether the land is leased before 
or after the policy change in 2004 on mode of land leasing was also included in the 
model, however, the coefficient is of positive sign yet insignificant. This may be due 
to the multicollinearity with other time dummy variables in the equation. When the 
policy dummy variable is included in the regression instead of all the time dummy 
variables, the coefficient of policy dummy variable is positive and statistically 
significant1. As the public land leasing advances towards market orientation and 
more records of LURs sales are available, a more accurate and robust land price 
index can e constructed to reflect the urban land market development.  
5.3 Summary of Empirical Study on Public Land Leasing in 
Beijing  
In this chapter, we do empirical study at both aggregate and disaggregate level to 
examine the public land leasing in Beijing. Beijing is experiencing a fast growing 
urban development in the past twenty years and the case of public land leasing in 
Beijing shows the success of urban land reform and its impacts on the wider 
economy (Deng, 2004). The government behavior which is embodied in the site 
density restriction and the mode by which urban land is leased has played a 
significant role in the urban land reform process. The tighter constraints on the site 
density tend to push up land leases prices, while modes of tender and auction will 
                                                        
1 Regression results are available from the author upon request. 
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result in higher land leasing prices than their counterpart of private negotiation. 
These hypotheses are tested by our empirical analysis based on the public land 
leasing data in Beijing. 
 
Analysis of local government behaviors confirms the importance of the political 
economy and rule of game in understanding China's public land leasing system. The 
decentralized public finance and competing interests in land use control between the 
different levels of government in Beijing affect the urban land leasing process and 
the spatial pattern of land prices and development density. By constraining or 
relaxing development density of the site the government regulations could influence 
the land leasing prices and moreover the revenues of land leases. In developing 
stage of urban land reform local governments offer various benefits such as tax 
reduction, low cost of land and so on to investors in order to attract more investment 
and raise public finance from it. It is also well know that the amount of investment 
attracted and local GDP are key standards for the government officials to get 
promotion. In many cases the land would be leased to the investors in lower prices 
by negotiation from local government in order to offer more beneficial packages to 
investors. The transition from administrative modes such as private negotiation to 
market mechanisms is gradual yet inevitable process in urban land reform in China. 
On the way to the market orientation, the modes of tender and auction are more and 
more adopted in the public land leasing. A more transparent and competitive urban 
land market is being formed as it follows the market economic principles. The 
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marketization of urban land will also have a profound impact on the housing 
markets and the overall economy. 
Figure 5.7 Regression Results of Kriging Estimation 
Dependent Variable: lnPPSM 
Independent 
Variable 
All Sample 2002-2003 2004-2005 











































































Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. MSE refers to the Mean Square Error. 
*: significant at the 5% level         **: significant at the 1% level 
#: significant at the 10% level 
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CHAPTER 6  
CONCLUSION, POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND 
LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
6.1 Conclusion 
This thesis tries to study the urban land reform, public land leasing and the 
underlying government behaviors in China, using an empirical analysis of public 
land leasing in Beijing. During the economic reform in China, a number of problems 
arise with the development of the urban land reform process and public land leasing. 
The empirical study of Beijing has provided better understanding on the common 
practices in public land leasing and the relationships among different levels of 
government, as well as the transformation of urban spatial structure with land 
development in the emerging urban land market. Meanwhile, this study also 
illustrated and analyzed the impacts of government behavior on urban land value in 
terms of site density restriction and the mode by which the public land is leased 
from the government.  
 
Through an in-dept empirical analysis of the public land leasing process in Beijing, 
this study answers several research questions and contributes to the knowledge in 
the following aspects: 
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(1) The marketization of land resources requires a price mechanism for the valuation 
of this state’s asset. The impacting factors in urban land values include structural, 
locational and time attributes as well as political considerations. Government 
regulations may have a significant impact of the land value and urban spatial 
structure especially in economy of transition. 
 
(2) Government behaviors reflecting in land use regulations have impacted on the 
process of public land leasing. Interests between different levels of government 
influence the outcomes of urban redevelopment. In terms of the site density 
restriction, the measured deviation of redevelopment density from its unconstrained 
level is consistent with a set of tradeoffs faced by the regulating authorities. Loosen 
the constraint on the FAR may result in higher land price and raise revenue for 
public finance In particular, concerns for congestion raise the restriction on 
redevelopment densities and thus tend to affect the land value. It is also noted that 
when urban land market advance towards market orientation, the previous 
administrative means of land leasing have been gradually replaced by the market 
mechanisms, which meets the call for a better market environment.  
 
(3) Analysis of local government behavior confirms the importance of the political 
economy in understanding China's public land leasing system and urban land reform. 
The financial decentralization and inter-governmental competition have motivated 
the local governments behave differently in the land leasing. In order to attract 
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revenue for the public finance, local governments tend to impose impact on the land 
leasing though the means of site density restriction and so on. In this sense, the 
government behavior influences the outcome of public land leasing and land reform. 
6.2 Policy Implications  
All these findings provide valuable experiences to both government regulations and 
real estate industry as how to increase transparency of the transactions and improve 
the market solution, upon which land use regulations and government intervention 
have significant impacts on the market reform. The research findings in this study 
have profound policy implications for policymakers in urban land reform.  
 
A well-functioning fiscal system is essential especially in the economy of transition 
towards market orientations. Fiscal decentralization has brought local government a 
greater autonomy in managing fiscal revenues and a complex inter-governmental 
relationship. On one hand, the primary goal for local governments is to raise as 
much revenue as possible in order to finance local developments and 
decentralization has delivered more incentives for local growth (Zhu, 1999). On the 
other hand, conflicts may arise when the central government sees a decline in 
revenue and the subsequent increase in central government’s budget deficit, as well 
as its undermined authority by local government. Balancing the incentives and 
needs among different levels of government has always been an underlying 
consideration for the fiscal policy-making. 
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With the urban land reform marching on, it is crucial to have a comprehensive 
approach combining the cost function and market value in order to produce better 
pricing mechanisms and benchmark price system for the reference in public land 
leasing. It is not only important for the land administrative authorities to take into 
account the determinants in urban land value, but also meaningful for the land 
developers to make sure how the land is evaluated in order to make appropriate 
financial decisions.  
 
As urban land reform and real estate market in China have been hot topics in the 
economy reform in the recent years, it is worthwhile to explore further on these 
issues, and thus more sound policy implications could be made for the better 
decision-making and the progress of market reform in the transition economy. 
6.3 Limitations and Future Research  
Urban land reform in China is still marching on and the market mechanisms are yet 
to be mature. A thorough revelation of the public land leasing mechanism and the 
institutional background of the government regulations on urban land reform are 
necessary to the understanding of various issues in real estate sectors as well as the 
overall economic reform in China. Given the sample size of the public land leasing 
data and the lack of a detail record of leasing and land use history on each parcel, 
many hypotheses regarding local government behavior and corporate strategy on 
land acquisition can only be tested indirectly in this study. For example, different 
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modes of urban land leasing may imply a self-selection mechanism which would 
bias the coefficient estimates on the mode variable. The empirical results can be 
justified by using two-stage Heckman procedure and more information on the land 
seller/buyer and other factors affecting the land leasing mechanism. In addition, 
more detailed transactions would also provide greater freedom in model specifi-
cation and statistical analysis, especially for better estimation accuracy and 
statistical inference in geostatistical method. 
 
Many other interesting issues involving China's urban land reform and public land 
leasing deserve further study. First, it would be interesting to explore more on the 
incentives of the government regulations in the public land leasing process, in terms 
of political economy and behavioral economics. As there are multiple roles in which 
governments and government officials are playing, the interactions and conflicts of 
these roles would be of great value to study and contribute to the knowledge of 
economy in transition. The expansion of researches on price discovery through 
public auctions and private tenders in land reform will also be an interesting issue as 
that may differentiate between the price effects of auctions and tenders. Second, 
with more players participating into the competition for valuable land resources for 
development, how real estate developers and other land users adopt market strategy 
to acquire land in public land leasing become increasingly important for them to 
survive in the market competition. Moreover, the evaluation of urban land forms the 
basis of cost-benefit and investment analysis of the real estate development.  
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Appendix I: Land Benchmark Prices (BMPs) System in Beijing 
Land benchmark prices served as the guideline land price and market reference 
point of land prices in each city. A BMP is the average price level established within 
a specific time period in a particular area/locality for a particular land use. BMPs 
system is set by the local government and usually adjusted every four to five year. 
For instance, the benchmark price in Beijing is obtained for certain land use for a 
particular land grade through the following fomula and the latest updated BMP table 
in 2002: 
 
BMP/m2 = (1) × plot ratio factor + [(2) + (3) ] × plot ratio + (4) × adjustment factor 
+ (5) or (6)  
 
Where: 
(1) is conveyance fee for the different land use such as commercial, office, 
residential and industrial; 
(2) is the fee charged for urban services and the connection of public utilities; 
(3) is the fee charged for neighborhood infrastructure; 
(4) is the resettlement fee in urban area; 
(5) is the resettlement fee in urban fringe area; 
(6) is the resettlement fee in rural area.  
 





Appendix II: Empirical Specifications in Regression Models 
II.1 Nonlinearity in Urban Land Prices 
These are numerous literatures that support the idea that urban land prices are 
nonlinear and appear to be an increasing concave function of parcel size 
(Brownstone and De Vanny, 1991; Cowell and Munneke, 1997, etc.). Allowing for 
the nonlinear nature of land prices reveals that the price structure could be much 
flatter in space than can be discovered through models that constrain land prices to 
be linear to functions of parcel size. In the hedonic pricing model of this study, it 
allows for nonlinearity of land price and then land area and its quadratic term are 
also included in the function. At the same time, it is also expected that the sign of 
the coefficient for the quadratic term would be negative as larger areas need to pay 
more but at a decreasing rate. 
For OLS estimate, there is a possibility that heteroskedasticity may be present with 
cross-sectional data. Therefore we can test for heteroskedasticity using the 
Breusch-Pagan test (BP test). The null hypothesis is that the data is homoskedastic. 
If the null hypothesis is rejected, OLS methodology cannot be used because the 
OLS estimators are no longer best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE). Then we have 











II.2 Kriging Estimation and Geostatistical Method 
 
Kriging is a minimum mean squared error statistical procedure for spatial prediction 
that assign a differential weight to observations that are spatially closer to the 
dependent variable’s location(Goldberger,1962).  
 
This predicted error is then added to the standard β~X  to make an improved 
prediction. The prediction at site 0s  is obtained by equations 1a-c. 
)(ˆ~)(ˆ 000 suxsY += β             (1a) 
ewsu ′=)(ˆ 0               (1b) 
)( 0
1 skKw −=              (1c) 
                                                                             
where )(ˆ 0su  is the predicted error at site 0s , )(ˆ 0sY  is the predicted value at site 
0s , 0x  is the vector of independent variable at site 0s , ( ) YKXXKX 111 ~~~ −−− ′′=β is 
the maximum likelihood estimate of the regression coefficients, and 1~ −K  is the 
correlation matrix obtained by substituting the ML estimate of 1b  and 2b  into the 
correlation function and applying this function to the data locations. 
 
In Kriging, the predicted error at any site 0s , is a weighted average of the regression 
residuals e  from the estimation sample. 
     ewsu ′=)(ˆ 0                                                   (2) 
The weights are chosen to minimize the expected value of the squared difference 
between the actual and predicted errors at site 0s . 
      [ ]{ } [ ]200020200 )(ˆ)(ˆ)(2)()(ˆ)( sususeseEsuseEMinF +−=−=  
              















            
(3)  
Where )( 0se is the true error at site 0s , )(ˆ 0su is the predicted error at site 0s , w  is 
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the vector of weights, e is the residual vector from the regression, C  is the 
covariance matrix for the estimation data, )( 0sc is the covariance vector between 
site 0s  and the estimation data, K  is the correlation matrix for the estimation data, 
)( 0sk is the correlation vector between site 0s  and the estimation data.  
In order to minimize F, take the partial derivatives of Equation (2) with respect to 
the vector w , and set these equal to zero, and solve for w  
     [ ] 02)(2 02 =+−=∂
∂ Kwsk
w
F σ                             (4) 
Then we have  )( 0
1 skKw −=                                  (5) 
 
Although both lattice and geostatistical approaches have achieved some success in 
the literature of real estate, there is little theoretical justification underlying the 
choice of the model. It is possible that the researcher is estimating a misspecified 
model because he lacks of theoretical guidance. To examine how well the models 
perform when the error structure has been incorrectly specified through a series of 
Monte Carlo experiments, Dubin (2004) finds that all the spatial models are robust 
with respect to standard statistical inference, and all predict better than the OLS. 
With respect to the prediction, there is a clear difference between the spatial models: 
the geostatistical models outperform the weight matrix models in the lattice 












Table A.1 Comparsion of Kriging Coefficients of Total Land Price and Unit 
Land Price 
Independent Variable Kriging Coefficient of 
Total Land Price 
(Std. error) 
Kriging Coefficient of 




























































Estimation Sample    1200 
Prediction Sample     163 
MSE              1.4291 
TheilsU            0.1041 
Estimation Sample    1200 
Prediction Sample     163 
MSE    1.4110 
TheilsU  0.1032 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. OLS regressions use a White correction for 
heteroscedasticity. MSE refers to the Mean Square Error. 
*: significant at the 5% level         **: significant at the 10% level 
#: significant at the 10% level 
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Table A.2 Comparison of OLS and Kriging Estimates 
Dependent Variable: lnPPSM 




lnFAR  0.8584** 
(0.0520) 
 0. 8611** 
(0.0507) 
















































Num. of observations        1200 
R-squared           0.3276 
Adjusted R-squared        0.3208 
F-statistic (Prob.)    48.20 (0.000000) 
MSE                1.6602 
Log Likelihood      -1537.659 
Dubin-Watson stat     1.6339 
Estimation Sample    1200 
Prediction Sample     163 
MSE              1.4110
TheilsU            0.1032
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. OLS regressions use a White correction for 
heteroscedasticity. MSE refers to the Mean Square Error. 
*: significant at the 5% level         **: significant at the 1% level 
#: significant at the 10% level 
